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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTORY ABSTRACT
Government corporations have been and continue to be
created to perform various
the public sector.

'business-like' functions within

While public corporate structures date

back to the turn of the century, they made their real po
litical debut during the 1930's as 'stabilization corpo
rations*.

Since that time, use of the corporate concept in

government has ebbed and flowed, experiencing significant
growth through the last two decades.

However, as govern

ment corporations have multiplied in recent years so have
the problems surrounding this form of organization.
According to Harold Seidman,

"Misgivings are being

expressed,...not only about the failure to develop effective
systems to assure public accountability, but by the tendency
to misuse the enterprise solely as a device to keep expendi
tures out of the budget and escape controls."^

Seidman

argues that rather than correcting "deficiencies" in core
government agencies. Congress creates more governmental
institutions in pursuit of political effectiveness,
thereby,

and

jeopardizes the integrity of the corporate form.

The U. S. Synthetic Fuels Corporation

(SFC) is an

example of a public enterprise created hastily and in
time of crisis.

For a host of reasons, it is also an

example of a well intentioned program that not only hasn't
lived up to its potential, but was perhaps, doomed from the
start.

In creating the SFC, Congress believed that flex

ibility was critical to the successful launching of the
synfuels program and therefore, deliberately exempted the
new Corporation from adherence to numerous executive
branch managerial l aws.

Despite exempting the Corporation

from most forms of presidential power. Congress created
provisions for 21 separate legislative vetos.

Therefore,

the SFC appears to be highly autonomous at the executive
branch level, but actually may be one of the most tightly
controlled corporations in recent memory.
What is unfortunate about this phenomenon, is that
Congress, in setting itself up as the primary overseer, also
made the SFC uniquely vulnerable to a host of political
pressures.

These pressures, in turn, created a terrific game

of political football over the last four to five years which
has exacted a heavy toll on the SFC.

The organization con

tinues to lose professional staff through attrition and
several departments within the Corporation have totally dis
appeared,

A few projects will have been funded, but the

production levels resulting will be nowhere near the levels
originally proposed by Congress in mid-1980.

Congressional

observers predict, in fact, that if currently pending legis
lation is successfully enacted, the Corporation could com
pletely close its doors to further project solicitations
2
by as early as the spring/summer of 1986,

The intent of this paper is to provide a descriptive
case study of the controversy which has engulfed the SFC
during its brief existence.

In particular, we will examine

the impact of the following areas on the performance of the
SFC:

(1) political and economic influences;

and organizational weaknesses;
problems;

(3) staffing and personnel

(4) poor enabling legislation;

autonomy versus oversight; and

(2) managerial

(5) questions of

(6) Congressional liaisons.

Before turning to this case study, however, we will examine
the history of and perennial issues surrounding public
corporations.

CHAPTER ONE:

FOOTNOTES

^Harold Seidman, "Public Enterprises in the USA,"
Annals of Public and Co-operative Economy I (March 1983):16.

2

Gary Knight, Former Congressional Affairs Director
of U. S. House Relations, U. S. Synthetic Fuels Corporation,
Staff Meeting, June 1985.

CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND

Irtroduction
Increasingly, modern government may be faced with a
new dilemma.

Citizens of western democracies continually

demand more services from the public sector, while simul
taneously distrust of government and the bureaucracy has
grown.

In recent decades, there has been a search for

alternative structures that will efficiently deliver
services within the public sector while surpassing the
tight controls of traditional government bureaucracies.
In reaction to this situation,

Ira Sharkansky

observes that modern states are both growing and withering
at the same time.

"They grow in response to incessant

demands for more services; they wither as officials
assign important activities to bodies that enjoy formal
grants of autonomy from the state.

Enter public enterprise."

It is true that every nation has a different approach
regarding public enterprises.

In contrast to the U.S.,

many countries operate most of their basic services through
publicly financed enterprises.

These enterprises may be

core agencies of the central government or they may be
quite autonomous.

Currently,

the trend tends to be falling

6

into the latter category.

Australia is at this enu of

the spectrum with a relatively small central, or core,
government and numerous autonomous, publicly financed
2
government corporations.
Conversely, the central govern
ment of the U.S. has historically provided few basic
services and where they have been provided, it has gener
ally been by core agencies.

Although the number of federal

government corporations has almost doubled since 1960,
their number and personnel remain small by comparison with
the rest of the federal government.
While the Federal government has been slow about
using the corporate form of organization, the states and
localities have not.

Regional, state, county, and city

governments have used such "authorities" to finance,
construct, or operate revenue-producing enterprises.
The Institute of Public Administration

(IPA) estimates

that in the late 1 9 7 0 's there were at least 6,000 local
and regional authorities and 1,000 state and interstate
corporations operating, a number that had increased to
almost 10,000 by 1981.

The number of federal corpora

tions was extimated then to be 35 by IPA.

However,

sources disagree on the actual amount at the federal
level today.

In 1983, the GAO cited 47

(See Appendix I),

while recently the United States House Government Oper
ations Committee defines only 4 3 such organizations as
corporations.^

It is clearly an issue of what criteria

are used to determine their existence.
At the federal level, the continued increase of
"contracting-out" for services, as well as the growth in
public enterprise, has tended to blur the line between
public and private sectors.

In recent years, there has

been a gradual dispersion of public functions away from
core government agencies toward independent agencies, quasigovernment organizations, government corporations, and
private corporations.

Whether or not this dispersion is

offering greater performance and efficiency is debatable.
The issue of significance here is that decision-making in
many areas is shifting from politically accountable core
agencies and executives toward somewhat unaccountable
entities, or to what Ron Moe of the Congressional Research
4
Service calls "the margin of government".
According to Moe,

"There is a lot of government on

the margin that is functioning largely unexamined by
political scientists.

Moe argues that since decisions

affecting public monies are increasingly made through
organizations not "effectively" accountable to either the
President or Congress, the current approach to political
science and/or public administration study is outdated.
"There remains an underlying assumption in American
political science literature that nearly all administra
tive policy and program implementation is conducted by
regular agencies of the government that are accountable
to the President and through him to the Congress.

8
The congressional objective for establishing
federal government corporations has been to create an
environment where seemingly business-type programs will
demand a high degree of automony and flexibility from
the traditionally rigid federal regulations found in
core agency organization.

Within this framework, federal

corporations are often exempt from civil service pay
scales and hiring practices, position ceilings, and
statutes governing procurement regulations.

Specific

enabling legislation for a given corporation may be
designed so that authorizations are 'off-budget':

the

budget process simply being reviewed by Congress annually
rather than requiring a formal submission through 0MB as
is mandated for all Executive Branch agencies.
Further, the public corporation is often created
with the attitude that .no other organizational form would
be sufficient.

Often in reaction to politically acute

situations. Congress establishes these usually single
purpose mechanisms to simplify an immediate and complex
government problem.

The potential advantages for use of

such a mechanism may be easy to enumerate, especially in
this era of "less government" sentiment:
from political influence,
flexibility,

2) managerial and budgetary

3) speed and efficiency,

to bond markets,

1) insulation

4) increased access

5) protected, earmarked funding for

priority projects and long term debt service,

6)business

like and self supporting management, and 7) use of a

mixed-ownership corporation, having the potential for
transfer to the private sector.*^
However, the disadvantages of using such organiza
tions as public problem solvers are less obvious, leaving
these corporations open to individual scrutiny, or at
best, questioning the logic of why this form of organiza
tion was utilized at a l l .

None of the advantages listed

above are automatically achieved by use of the public
corporation.

As recent history has proven, the record of

public corporations at all levels of U.S. Government in
cludes examples of political corruption, mismanagement,
financial debacle, and construction and operating failures.
Furthermore,

it can be argued that the corporate form has

sometimes been chosen by the political sector as a 'cureall ' mechanism, thrown into a precarious commercial arena
with unrealistic and immediate expectations, i.e. the U.S.
Synthetic Fuels Corporation

(USSFC).

Although, there are

numerous success stories which more than justify the use
of the corporate form for solving public problems, there
are certainly examples of politically ill-conceived
corporate structures that may have achieved the desired
objectives more efficiently through alternate public or
private structures.

Significantly,

it may often be due

to this inappropriate political choice of where real or
perceived unaccountability multiplies and is followed by
political disaster.

10

Moreover, wide variation exists in the legal,
financial, structural and policy parameters of public
corporations.

This issue alone has prompted concerns among

critics and scholars for some time regarding the improper
use of the corporate concept.
the word

It is often contended that

'corporate' is being used to assign special

privileges, real or presumed, to what otherwise would be
core agencies that have no commercial function and produce
no revenue.

In other words, the corporate concept can

easily be abused, or suffer from perception of abuse,
especially in Washington's highly visible, national polit
ical environment.

Daily interaction with the forces of

public decision-making will ultimately unveil any attempts
to avoid accountability to Executive Branch management
agencies.

Compounding this persuasive, pragmatic argument

is the intellectual debate from academia that has yet to
resolve an accepted doctrine guiding the structure and
activities of corporations.

In fact, defining the govern

ment corporation may currently be an impossible task,

for

as we shall see, numerous corporations have at their in
ception been defined differently varying with the political
era in which they were created, the purposes, the industry,
the commercial environment, and the creators themselves.

Historical Background
First Part of the 20th Century
The corporate form is often believed to be a creation
of the industrial revolution.

However, corporate bodies

as legal entities are cited as far back as 205 A.D. under
Q
Roman law.
Under the mercantilist political doctrines
of the nineteenth century, public corporations were recog
nized in the U.S. for their abilities in performing
certain functions.

Although, these functions were largely

limited then to "internal improvements", i.e. turnpikes,
canals, and local utilities, in 1846, Congress set up the
Smithsonian Institution as a corporate entity
tering the bequest of James Smithson.

for adminis

This was the pre

decessor of other establishments - the National Academy
of Sciences, the National Home for Disabled Volunteer
Soldiers, and the National Training Schools for Boys and
Girls - of a charitable or cultural nature conducted in
corporate form as adjuncts of the federal government.
Government-owned enterprises,

like many elements of

American government, have complex historical roots that
have shaped their growth and common opinions toward them.
According to Annmarie Walsh in The Public's Business,
"These roots are the mixed heritage of libertarian

12
economic theory, moralistic attitudes toward public debt,...
the pragmatic experiments of the New Deal, and reaction
against the expansion of government activities that
followed.
It is true, though, that the federal government made
little use of this structure of organization until compara
tively recent times.

In 1904, the U.S. acquired the Panama

Railroad Company when the assets of the French New Panama
Canal Company were purchased.

The Railroad was subsequently

operated as an adjunct of the Panama Canal, but it was not
until World War I that the first wholly-owned government
corporations were created.

To accomplish its wartime ob

jectives, the government found it necessary to construct
and operate a merchant fleet, to build, rent, and sell
houses, to buy and sell sugar and grain, to lend money,
and to engage in other commercial enterprises.

An example

is the U.S. Grain Corporation,^^ established to perform
emergency functions.
period, politically,

However,

it was typical of the

that these bodies were very shortlived,

and thus, their policies and structures were never questioned
before liquidation began.
During the 1 9 3 0 's, a number of corporations were
formed to help the starved, domestic economy.

Collectively,

these bodies have been referred to as the stabilization
corporations; many of them being limited to the agricultural
field, where they were viewed simply as temporary supple
ments to their private sector equivalents.

The purpose of

13
these agriculturally oriented corporations was to permit
greater liquidity and longer-term commitments in commodity
markets, and to make distress loans to farmers.

The New

Deal also created corporations that made distress loans to
homeowners, banks, insurance companies, and railroads.
President Hoover had established the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation

(RFC) which financed many of the public enter

prises during the depression.

The RFC was a federal cor

poration engaged in investment banking.

Ultimately,

"it

provided $1.5 billion in loans for government-owned,
revenue-producing projects, many of them undertaken by
wholly-owned state and local government corporations
specially created to take advantage of RFC financing.
Perhaps due to their political success in desperate
economic times,
alized,

such organizations were easily institution

i.e., the Commodity Credit Corporation, the Federal

Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal National Mortgage
Association, and of course, the Tennessee Valley Authority
all still exist today.

Moreover, as these organizations

were created, procedures for controlling them developed
only through piecemeal administrative action.

Therefore,

critics often attacked the apparent lack of accountability
during this period.
However, popularity for the government corporation
concept ebbed and flowed between the World Wars.
ficantly,

Signi

it was the proponents of the Scientific Manage

ment movement who showed enthusiasm for the concept because
it tended to enhance the role of professional public

14
administrators, and diminish direct accountability to
political leaders.

According to Moe,

"One legacy of the

Scientific Management movement during the early decades
of this century was the belief that the corporate form of
organization run by a professionally trained manager was
superior to a regular agency run by a politically accountable executive."

12

It is clear that elements of this

attitude continually surface in Washington.
During this period, the Tennessee Valley Authority
(TVA) was the promising prototype to emulate.
sented agency autonomy with efficiency;

TVA repre

it was "a sign in

the sky, an indication of things to c o m e ."^^ David Lilienthal,
Chairman of the Board of the TVA, envisioned the decision
making process used by the agency as "grass roots
democracy."

14

According to Lilienthal,

"Congress in 193S took advantage of the opportunity
that its selection of the independent corporate
device created, and freed the TVA of the conventional
procedures of government agencies and bureaus. The
TVA continues in this autonomous status; it is not
part of any of the existing bureaus and departments,
and the head of the TVA reports directly to the
President and to Congress...... Suppose these princi
ples of management and decentralization, which
Congress made it possible for TVA to put into effect
in this valley, should be extended throughout the
government.
Would it mean the virtug^ abolition of the
historic departments in Washington?"
Indeed,

it appears that TVA's unprecedented autonomy

was the subject of much debate, especially from those
concerned with the challenge to the President's management
authority represented by the corporation.

Lilienthal's

somewhat populist's views toward the largely autonomous

15
government corporation were countered by those political
scientists who supported the government corporation con
cept, but who also wanted these corporations to be
politically accountable in a direct manner to the President
and his appointed officials.

Traditional theories of

administrative organization were antagonistic to the
existence of autonomous administrative entities, and
markedly biased in favor of a closely coordinated execu
tive branch.

Although, TVA simply fueled Roosevelt's

political confidence,

"a corporation clothed with the

power of government, but possessed of the initiative and
flexibility of a private e n t e r p r i s e H o w e v e r ,

the

debate finally culminated in 1937 with the release of the
Brownlow Committee Report which primarily advocated the
"integrationist" position that by 1939 placed most cor
porations under a supervisory agency, other than TVA and
the FDIC.

The Report has all the appearances of being a

political compromise.
By 194 0, almost all the corporations had been
"integrated" into the departmental structure, although
there remained considerable diversity among financial
matters.

Meanwhile,

the national build-up for World War

II provided incentive for creating a new set of corporations
The RFC created subsidiaries that engaged in petroleum,
metals, rubber, and other defense supply production and
distribution."

By 1945, there were sixty-three wholly-

owned and thirty-eight partly owned federal corporations,

16
plus nineteen noncorporate credit agencies and hundreds
of enterprises from ropemaking to laundries and super
markets run by the m i l i t a r y . A l t h o u g h

the number of

federal corporations grew to their peak during World War
II, many were merely adaptions of their World War I
precedents.

Again, many of these were easily liquidated

after the War since they were considerably integrated
into the overall emergency organization.
While Congress recognized that this increasingly
large body of organizations needed to be effectively
controlled, the debate of conflicting emotions regarding
government corporations continued.

Conservatives wanted

government to be "run in a more business-like manner",
but also often viewed public corporations as a threat to
the private sector, arguing that TVA shouldn't be in the
power business.

Simultaneously,

liberals argued for an

autonomous TVA, but were concerned about the erosion of
accountability to the Executive Branch and Congress.
According to Moe,

"James Burnham, a critic of TVA,

saw in this government corporation,

the triumph of a new

managerial class that sought to usurp the fundamental
institutions of democracy to serve their own class
purposes."

18

Meanwhile, Philip Selznick observed,

"In

America...the TVA is unquestionably a rallying point for
those who favor a welfare state."

19

The value of the

autonomous federal corporation for Lilienthal was the
fact that it gave considerable powers to public

17
administrators who were "closer to the people" than the
bureaucracy in Washington.

20

In 1941, Herman Pritchett addressed an irony
surrounding the government corporation;

"The paradox is

that government corporations remain and even increase in
number while the government corporation is passing away."

21

Pritchett, a long time proponent of the corporate form,
was referring to the successful efforts of the late 1 9 3 0 's
to apply standard administrative procedures to most cor
porations, i.e. the Brownlow Report.

He further surmised,

"It becomes increasingly difficult and unwise to
talk about the 'government corporation', for the
attributes which marked the earlier federal cor
porations and made them representatives of a
distinctive type of administrative organization
have been disappearing before our eyes, like the
Cheshire cat.
Soon there may be nothing left but
a smile to mark the spot where the government
corporation once stood."22
Pritchett may have had reason for concern.

The

corporate form was about to experience a major historical
landmark.

Legislative control began at the close of

World War II, occurring in 1945 in two stages.
Harry Byrd's

Senator

(D-VA) Joint Committee on Reduction of

Nonessential Federal Expenditures studied the government
corporation dilemma.

The Committee concluded that the

use of the corporate concept had been diminished to a
tangled maze of quasi-governmental corporations with
little Congressional and Executive oversight, few fiscal
controls, and many instances of direct competition with
the private sector.

The George Act was enacted in February
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of that year, which required GAO to audit annually the
financial transactions of all government corporations.
However, in December, the more comprehensive Government
Corporation Control Act

(Control Act)

superseded these

audit requirements.

The Government Corporation Control Act (194 5)
The most significant outcomes of the Control Act
were the mandates for improved budgeting procedures, the
GAO requirements to audit and report on government corpora
tion activities to Congress, and finally, the control over
financial transactions by Treasury.

Originally, most

corporations were exempted from Budget Bureau
procedures.

(now 0MB)

It was believed that since most corporations

had been free from the requirements seeking Congressional
appropriations, there was no
review.

However,

need for Budget Bureau

the Budget Bureau influenced the Control

Act legislation sufficiently to demand the requirement
that wholly-owned government corporations had to submit
an annual "business-type budget" or "plan of operation".
GAO auditing requirements also had been exempted from most
previous legislation creating corporations.

Moreover,

the Act is not a general incorporation act, and therefore,
the charter for each federal government corporation is
created by the enabling legislation passed by Congress.
This portion of the Act was designed primarily to assure
that no corporation would henceforth be created by an
agency or a corporation,

as had been done by the RFC.

19
Subsequently,

this feature alone has given considerable

organizational flexibility to Congress.
Of course, Pritchett was among the critics of the
new Act,

In 194 6, he wrote pessimistically,

"the American

experience with autonomous public corporations is substantially at an end".

23

According to Pritchett, Congress

in its effort to assure public accountability, had
sacrificed the managerial flexibility that had made public
enterprises potentially creative units of government.
However, despite such criticism of the Act which has con
tinued to the present,

"no persuasive evidence has been

presented to demonstrate that the Control Act failed either
to provide effective accountability and control or
impaired the capability of government corporations to
function in a business-like manner".

24

Indeed, Harold Seidman has termed the Control Act
the "Decontrol Act".

25

Seidman claims the Act was kept

deliberately broad in approach for political reasons,
and notes that it provided qualitative rather than quan
titative reviews of corporate budgets.

Moreover, he believes

the Act protected financial and managerial flexibility
from further erosion by the central managerial agencies,
particular the Budget Bureau.

Seidman observes,

"the

Corporation Control Act is one of the most significant
developments in the art of public administration.

With

it the government corporation can be said to have come of
age in the United States".

26

However, Seidman may express

in

20
an unusually favorable attitude toward this law since he
was on the Government Corporations staff of the Budget
Bureau during the initial years of its implementation.
Subsequent Developments
Following the peak of activity during World War II,
use of the corporate form in the next decade or two waned
considerably.

Writing in 1970, Albert Abel concluded,

"that trend will probably continue in the near future.
Scandals in the operation of the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation, which caused or at least occasioned its
termination, have put federal government corporations as
a class on the defensive before public opinion."

27

In 1954,

Wartime corporations were terminated and the RFC and its
subsidiaries were liquidated, cutting the number of
government corporations in half.
Furthermore, after passage of the Control Act, the
departmental "integrationist" philosophy continued to
gain strength as did a dubious attitude toward autonomous
organizations, generally.

More and more government

corporations were under the umbrella of departmental
structures.

"For example, the Saint Lawrence Seaway

Development Corporation was established in 1954.

Its

main purpose after construction of the Seaway was to co
operate with its Canadian counterpart in the control and
operation of the Seaway.

However,

in 1966 it was placed

in the newly created Department of Transportation and.

21
subjected to the direction and supervision of the Secretary
of Transportation."

28

This trend was paralleled by a debate in Congress
and by scholars over what characteristics were considered
essential to the corporation in federal government.

Then

in 194 8, the debate culminated when President Truman in
his Budget Message addressed criteria for creation of a
government corporation.

According to Truman, a corporation

should only be created when a program:
1) is predominantly of a business nature;
2) is revenue-producing and potentially selfsustaining;
3) involves a large number of business-type trans
actions with the public;
4) requires greater flexibility than the customary
type of appropriations budget ordinarily permits.
Since this list of criteria is all financially related,
and does not address policy autonomy, Truman's message may
be interpreted to argue that federal corporations are
nothing more than "agencies" with only certain financial
discretion.

Indeed, Goldberg and Seidman have argued,

"despite some resemblance to its private prototype in
outward form and operating methods, from the viewpoint of
purpose and overall government organization,

the government

corporation is merely another agency of government".
This view also coincides with a 1945 Supreme Court opinion
regarding government corporations as agencies in the case
of Cherry Cotton Mills vs. the United States:

22
"That the Congress chose to call it (Reconstruction
Finance Corporation) a corporation does not alter its
characteristics so as to make it something other than
what it actually is, an agency selected by the Govern
ment to accomplish purely governmental purposes".31
Finally, the first Hoover Commission, meeting between
1947 and 1949, and its resulting Report are noteworthy post
war developments of the corporate concept.

Essentially,

the

Commission advocated the corporate form in government stating,
"we recommend that straight-line business activities be
incorporated so as to secure greater flexibility in manage
ment and simpler accounting, budgeting, and auditing
methods".

32

However, the Commission Report gave little

credence to policy autonomy, clearly wanting control to be
focused within the Chief Executive.

The Report recommended

that the executive branch be reorganized to "establish a
clear line of control from the President to those depart
ment and agency heads and from them to their subordinates
with correlative responsibility from these officials to
the President, cutting through the barriers which have in
many cases made bureaus and agencies partially independent
of the Chief Executive".
Throughout the 1 9 5 0 's the debate continued between
those who argued that the federal corporation should be
awarded policy autonomy, and those who felt the corporation
should be "integrated";

the "integrationists" believing

that special financing mechanisms were the key distinctions
from federal agencies.

Marshall Dimock was a chief pro

ponent of complete policy autonomy, and thought corporations

23
should be accountable to Congress, not the President:
"Congress is the overall board of directors...".^*

While

Harold Seidman, upholding his view that these federal
corporate bodies are not distinguishable from "agencies",
argued corporations are "full-fledged members of the
government team"^^ and thus, should be accountable to the
President.

The Current Situation
The Range of Government Corporation Activities
The notion that emerged in the 1 9 5 0 's that federal
corporations could be both politically accountable and
financially independent, rapidly became a dying issue.
During the late 1 9 5 0 's and early 1 9 6 0 's, leaders and
public administrators apparently grew indifferent to the
corporate form;

little was written on the subject, and few

federal corporations were being established.
However, enthusiasm for corporations grew after the
successful launching of the Communications Satellite
Corporation (ComSat) by legislation in 1962.

ComSat was

not established as a government corporation, but rather a
private,

for-profit corporation sponsored by the govern

ment, possessing attractive advantages which encouraged
lawmakers in their search for alternate forms of organiza
tion to solve difficult and on-going problems.

Though

"no other entity approaches ComSat in its complexity
some of its characteristics appear to a degree in later
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private, government-sponsored corporations.
For this reason, ComSat was an important precedent
toward establishing the new breed of corporations in
recent decades.

Public opinion toward government corpora

tions would be reshaped by the shining example of ComSat:
a problem was being addressed by the federal government
without a new department being created, adding to the
"bureaucracy".

Harold Seidman claims that ComSat was an

important precedent not only because it appeared to bridge
the gap between the private and public sectors and proved
commercially viable, but because it also provided an
example to many on "how to beat the system".
In the two decades since ComSat*s creation, a
numerous variety of government corporate entities have
sprung into existence.

The range of government corpora

tion services and operations is enormous.

There are many

corporations who for years have provided vitally important
functions to the public, and who regionally, if not
nationally have a major impact on the economy, i.e. TVA
and the Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation.
The variety of activity may cover anything from the
Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation which awards grants
to stimulate housing improvement in depressed cities, to
the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation and the F.D.I.C.
Insurance, savings associations, security brokers and
private pension funds are all services provided by a
major group of government corporations.

Another large
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group of federal corporations provides or buys mortgages,
loans, loan and price guarantees or price agreements, or
enters into joint ventures, i.e. the U.S. Synthetic Fuels
Corporation.

The Government National Mortgage Association

has guaranteed close to $100 billion in mortgage-backed
securities; and the Synfuels Corporation has been provided
$20 billion out of an $88 billion authorization for loan
guarantees and price supports to stimulate the development
of a synthetic fuels industry.
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Therefore, the largest number of corporations offer
insurance or financial services, often at subsidized rates.
According to Walsh,

"most federal enterprise activities...

are banking and insurance-related activities...(which) do
not compete with private financial establishments, but
generally absorb some risks from the private sector and
expand markets for private services".
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Only a minority of federal enterprises or corpora
tions provide material,

revenue-producing goods and

services,

i.e. electricity, fertilizer

equipment

(Federal Prison Industries), and railway and

seaway services

(TVA), supplies,

(Amtrak, Conrail, St. Lawrence Seaway).

The Inter-American Foundation, the Corporation for Public
Broadcasting,

and the Legal Services Corporation do not

produce revenue, but award grants.

Significantly, most

corporations deal with the public, or with private sector
organizations, or individuals who are all defined by the
terms of the enabling statute.

However, there are a few
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whose dealings are only with government agencies and othei
government corporations.,

i.e the Federal Financing Bank

and the Federal Prison Industries.
Impact on the Economy and Credit Markets?
A great part of the difference between a corporation
and an agency arises from the method of financing its
operations.

A corporation's funds are generally derived

from such sources as capital appropriations, which are not
subject to fiscal year limitations, revenues, and borrowings
from the Treasury or the public.

Corporations are rarely

dependent on annual appropriations for their funds, other
than a few exceptions:

the U.S. Synthetic Fuels Corporation,

the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation
expenses)

and the T.V.A.

(administrative

(nonrevenue programs).

In general, it may be said that the system of annual
appropriations is inapplicable to government corporations
involved in business operations, and needing the necessary
flexibility.

However, according to John McDiarmid,

"some

critics have characterized permanent appropriations,
revolving funds, and initial capitalizations as

'back-door

treasury h a n d -outs' that defeat the purpose of democratic
government and give the recipients license to extravagance
and waste".
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It is difficult to counter the arguement

that public monies must be controlled, but financial
control of government corporations should be monitored in
other ways besides annual appropriations.

Otherwise, the

maximum benefits of the corporate form are not realized.
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McDiarmid cites an interesting post-World War I
example of agency dependence on annual appropriations by
the Inland and Coastwise Waterways Service which became
a "target of scathing c r i t i c i s m " G e n e r a l

Ashburn was

the chief of the Service, and blamed many of its failures
upon the dependence on annual appropriations:
"Its inability to finance itself in periods of
depression, thus necessitating an appeal to Congress
for funds, opening the flood gates of criticism with
the resultant agitation as to whether or not Congress
will, through failure to appropriate, cause the
cessation of an operation that is economically sound,
the destruction of a solvent transportation agency,
the failure of a successful waterway demonstration,
because of the law against a Government agency
creating a deficit; and under the limits set by such
conditions the line is incapable of expansion unless
there be a further extension of governmental
ownership".
As a government corporation dependent on annual
appropriations,

the T.V.A. represents the other side of

the arguement, enjoying a history of relatively little
difficulty in obtaining funds and still remaining free from
Congressional interference in policy matters.

However,

the noncommercial nature of many of T.V. A . 's functions is
an important consideration here.

T.V.A. also obtains much

of its funds by issuing revenue bonds.

This is one reason

why T.V.A. can easily be characterized as half agency and
half corporation;

"alternating between the two categories

as it's politically convenient".
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A government corporation assigned a commercial
activity requires flexibility to respond promptly to
changes in the market demand for its services.

For

28
example, credit agencies have to adjust to changes in the
money markets.

If Congress insisted on annual and line-

item limit, tions in a corporation budget, the purpose
would be defeated for creating a corporate body in the
first place.
However, the political reality of the matter has
dictated that unless a corporation is totally, or at least
partially self-sustaining. Congress will always control
annual appropriations.

The Saint Lawrence Seaway Develop

ment Corporation generates its own operating funds through
toll collection.

Therefore, the Corporation is not appro

priated funds annually.

Rather, Congressional control is

exercised by authorization of expenditures for the
Corporation.
Although, currently the political and economic
debate surrounding government enterprise funding is
centered on the
tinually posed:

'off-budget' issue.

The question con

What is the impact on the economy and

the credit markets of the billions hidden in credit
authority for government
"OBE's"?
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'off-budget enterprises' or

While many of these federal enterprises have

continued to expand their attractive credit terms, it
remains law that the financial activities for many
government corporations are excluded from the budget.
In Washington,

this issue has turned into a raging politi

cal debate, becoming a key target of the Reagan Adminis
tration's "budget-cutting mentality", i.e, the U.S.
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Synthetic Fuels Corporation's obligational authority was
cut last summer by $5.2 billion.
For FY'80, government corporations alone possessed
$175 billion in credit a u t h o r i t y . I n FY'81, governmentsponsored enterprises generated half of the unreported
deficit, equaling $23.6 b i l l i o n . F u r t h e r ,

many govern

ment-sponsored enterprises are granted special preferences
and certain tax exemptions which permit them to borrow
funds for government purposes at rates only slightly above
the Treasury's own rates and lend the money to certain
specified groups.

Thus, some federally sponsored enter

prises are private in name only, and are yet another way
in which the federal government directs the allocation of
billions of dollars of credit without being subject to
the federal budget review process.
Walsh in The Public's Business,

Contrary to Annmarie

it is often agreed that

such special assistance granted federally sponsored enter
prises may hinder the development of private firms which
would compete in performing similar services, and possibly
more efficiently.
The managerial and financial flexibility for commer
cial government enterprises is only one reason for 'offbudget ' spending.

Political motivations by Congress are

often another advantage of the

'off-budget' mechanism.

Politicians can subsidize a particular group without
resorting to the appropriations process by enacting
various forms of "sweetheart legislation".

The benefits

30
here are not only avoi ;ing the requirement to be counted
in the annual deficit total, but also eliminating possible
program funding cuts likely in the annual appropriations
process.

"As one budget analyst puts its, keeping the

Federal Financing Bank off-budget

'enables on-budget

agencies to redirect economic resources and promote their
goals without affecting the on-budget outlays'.

Congress'

own research arm, the Congressional Research Service, is
more b l u n t .

The existence of off-budget programs, it says,

'disguises the size of the government's activities'."
However,
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the long term economic disadvantages for

many programs to remain off-budget pose a strong arguement
for on-budget reporting.

Primarily, opponents of these

OBE's argue the devastating affects on the deficit.

0MB

questions the need for budget flexibility for corporations
to include exemption from budget totals and the budget
review process.

Of course, GAO argues that on-budget

reporting strengthens accountability:

credit financing

involving money derived by government borrowing should be
on-budget, and subject to on-budget limitations, regardless
of the structure of the corporation, i.e. wholly-owned,
mixed public-private, or private.
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Appendix II charts six corporations which GAO has
defined as receiving federal funds and reporting their
funding off-budget, either entirely or in part.

Since

their financing is excluded from the budget, it is
naturally feared that federal management and financial
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control is sever-. *.y weakened.

Furthermore, excluding these

corporations from the budget understates the budget totals
in terms of budget authority, receipts, and outlays.
sequently,

Con

this results in an unclear picture of federal

spending, revenues, liability, and deficit.
Moreover, total spending authority for these corpor
ations includes not only authority to spend appropriated
and borrowed funds, defined as budget authority, but also
authority to spend other funds such as repayments of loans
and charges for services.

These gross obligations obvious

ly present a clearer picture of spending authority than
does budget authority alone.

GAO observes,

"for Congress to decide on budget totals and to make
priority allocations among functions under the budget
process, it must have complete information on the
total levels of federal activities.
On-budget
reporting of financial transactions of these cor
porations would strengthen overall financial
accountability in the federal government by provid
ing information essential to long range forecasts
of revenues and expenditures.
It would also
strengthen management control by subjecting these
corporations to the full range of executive and
congressional decisionmaking processes".49
Currently, the Administration is making efforts to
require that corporations submit their budgets to 0MB.
It is noteworthy that this current struggle for financial
control of federal corporations transcends the demands
for control debated in the post-war period.

However,

it

will be politically difficult to impose financial disci
pline on corporations which submit their budgets directly
to Congress.

32
Flexibility Versus Accountability
Use of the corporate form is a response to the lack
of flexibility defined by the parameters of a government
agency.

This corporate freedom is necessary, it is argued,

in order for the organization to successfully maneuver
within a commercial environment.

However, without mana

gerial prudence and restraint, public corporations may
tread on dangerous territory,

flouting the policies and

authority of the Chief Executive to whom they are politically
accountable.

It is essential that the President have the

power to coordinate policies applying to government enter
prises with those of the government as a whole.
According to its opponents, the Synthetic Fuels
Corporation has lacked political accountability, especially
in regard to the executive branch.

Although the President

appoints the Synfuels Board, SFC does not have an over
sight agency which certainly diminishes the political
clout of the Administration regarding synfuels policymaking.
A closer study of this point will be discussed in Chapter III
Creation of public corporations reflect a disenchant
ment with federal government organization and personnel,
a belief that the corporate form is superior to the
federal agency model, and a desire for flexibility in
policy-making.
are many :

The reasons behind the drive for flexibility

no civil service regulations, no conflict of

interest rules, and likely avoidance of the Congressional
appropriations process.

However,

from a public
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administration perspective,

some believe the corporate

trend has a debilitating effect upon government institu
tions and the civil service.

Harold Seidman argues that

the increasing reliance on government-sponsored enter
prises deflects us from addressing the real problem:

How

can we make the federal government more responsive and
accountable in a continuously changing environment?^^
In recent years, the problem has only been compounded
Political response to each new national dilemma is often to
create another public enterprise.
the illusion of a 'quick fix'.

Politically, this gives

Rather than reform highly

rigid and entangled personnel and administrative proce
dures in the bureaucracy, legislators find it easier to
simply exempt new corporations from these onerous require
ments.

But the overall effect weakens the ability of

core agencies to become more developed and innovative.
This is coupled by the existence of quasi-independent
corporations performing public mandates, but often with
minimal accountability to politically responsible
officials.

Seidman believes that the politics between

the Administration and Congress only continues to encour
age the situation:

"The proliferation of

'twilight

z o n e ' agencies is likely to continue as long as the
President and Congress insist on playing a political
shell game with federal employment statistics and offbudget federal expenditures".^^
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But ironically, in its drive for administrative
flexibility,

Congress has exempted many corporations from

Executive controls and then burdened them with controls
of its o w n .

Often such controls may limit the ability

to reach statutory objectives.

For example,

the Energy

Security Act, establishing the SFC, provides for numerous
legislative vetos, personnel and budget ceilings, and an
Inspector General which is unprecedented for government
corporations.
In conclusion, the current situation is one of
disarray and inconsistency, and has evolved for several
reasons.

Although more stringent controls often evolve

as compensation, the Government Corporation Control Act
has been increasingly ignored and many new corporations
have been excluded from its provisions.

Also, constit

uencies and their sponsoring Congressional committees
combine efforts to achieve independence from controls by
the Administration.

So each new corporation is created

in an ad hoc and varied manner.

Thus, clear precedents

for establishing a balance between flexibility and account
ability are often missing.

In fact, it appears that

often the management of the new corporation is left to
judge where this balance will be found.

However, as noted

in the SFC case study, this situation often leaves the
possibility for managerial abuse wide open.
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Government Corporation Autonomy:

Fact or Fiction?

While traditional theory suggests that federal
corporations should act at "arm's length" from core
government entities, practice may prove this a legal
fiction.

Studies in the U.S. reveal that, if anything,

government corporations are highly controlled.

The fact

remains that these corporations operate in a political and
economic system which is interdependent rather than
independent.

The public enterprise must interact with

government and non-government institutions on whom they
may depend.
However, the traditional defense of the autonomous
government corporation concept relies heavily on the
analogy of the private corporation.

But the 194 8 Hoover

Commission Report was antagonistic toward this autonomous
concept.

In a 1949 issue of the American Political Science

Review, Marshall Dimock, led the counterattack, arguing
that a board of directors was an indepensable feature of a
'true* government corporation,

and that because public

corporations rarely made political or policy oriented
decisions, accountability to the President was not a
critical element for these public entities.
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Writing in 1952, Harold Seidman initially debated
the view that a board of directors is essential for
governing a public corporation.

In so doing, he also

attacked the belief that such organizations are or should
be autonomous.

In fact, over the years, Seidman appears
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to argue that the whole concept of autonomy only invites
abuse.

"Government corporations are organized to a-

chieve a public purpose authorized by law.
is often forgotten.

This fact

So far as purpose is concerned, a

corporation cannot be distinguished from any government
agency.
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Seidman*s arguments may be especially poignant
in the complex political and policy-making process of
the 1 9 8 0 's.

It may well be impossible and/or unwise

to divorce any public entity from the mainstream of
other political and economic institutions.
claims Seidman,

"is two edged.

"Autonomy",

It means not only

freedom from outside direction and control, but also
exclusion from the 'official family' and close working
relationships with top policy-making officials.

These

informal day-to-day associations afford an official
(and an organization)

the most favorable opportunity

to influence policy determinations."
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Indeed, examples of two government corporations
and their relative effectiveness within the public
arena may illustrate the varying desirability of the
autonomy concept.

The Saint Lawrence Seaway Develop

ment Corporation created in 1953 was designed to be
headed by a single administrator.

Since 1966 it has

been under the Secretary of Transportation for policy
purposes, thereby directly making the organization

accountable to the President.

Apparently, this corpora

tion is regarded as well managed and as achieving its
mission.
On the other hand, the SFC was designed to be
governed by a board of directors.

As we shall discover

in the case study, this may well have been a political
mistake and a detriment to the organization's mission,
especially since the entity is non-revenue producing.
Furthermore, although highly controlled by Congress,
there exists some curious twists in the SFC enabling
legislation that allow for generous autonomy, especially
in relation to the Executive Branch.

It can be con

vincingly argued that such a unique set of freedoms
and restraints spelled political disaster from the
start for the SFC.
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CHAPTER III
A CASE STUDY
The U.S. Synthetic Fuels Corporation
Analysis of History/Enacting^ Legislation/Mission
In order to fully appreciate the genesis of the
U.S. Synthetic Fuels Corporation, it is necessary to
reflect on political history, particularly during the
latter half of the Carter Administration.

In 1980, the

U.S. Embassy in Tehran was seized by Iranian terrorists.
The Middle East was a caldron of crises.

The Organiza

tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries was blackmailing
the United States with oil prices that had reached
$41 per barrel.

U.S. policymakers feared a cutoff of

foreign crude would cripple the economy and threaten
national security.

Against this backdrop of fear and

insecurity, political hysteria was rampant in Washington
Motivated by such a scenario, undoubtedly both real
and imagined. Congress bullishly created the federally
financed Synthetic Fuels Corporation

(SFC).

The SFC was established by the Energy Security
Act, signed by President Carter on June 30, 1980.

The

mandate of the Corporation was to stimulate industry
to produce 500,000 barrels per day of crude oil
42
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equivalent by 1987 and 2,000,000 barrels per day by
1990, enough to substantially reduce U.S. dependence
on imported oil.

In an effort to accomplish these

production levels, the Act envisioned two stages for
awarding financial assistance toward creating a syn
thetic fuels program.

The first phase called for

funding of up to $20 billion, followed by a second
phase in which authorized funding could reach an
additional $68 billion.

Moreover, the Act directed

the Corporation to issue a series of solicitations
encompassing a diversity of technologies, i.e. coal
liquefaction, coal gasification, syncrude from oil
shale, peat to methanol, and tar sands development.
At the onset, a special Treasury account, known
as the Energy Security Reserve was established with
$17.5 billion in funds from which the SFC was author
ized to grant direct loans, loan and price guarantees,
purchase agreements, and joint venture participation.
The government's financial backing was intended to
help private utilities and pipeline and energy com
panies borrow funds to build synthetic fuel plants.
In order to qualify, these companies could not be
able to get credit elsewhere.

Hundreds of these firms

indicated their intention to seek these forms of
assistance.

There would be no direct cost to the

government unless the project failed to operate, or
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the finished product was so expensive that it required
a subsidy to be marketed.
Indeed, Congressional intention was that the
newly created Corporation function somewhat similarly
to an investment bank; a publicly funded entity, yet
a 'business-like' organization void of political
pitfalls.

It was only through this public corporate

medium that Congress felt it was possible to draw
private sector interest toward synfuel development.
This public corporation would serve as common ground
for negotiation to encourage private capital to invest
in already proven synfuel technologies.
For the same reasons that Congress believed in
198 0 that the new synfuels development program needed
a corporate form, lawmakers also argued the necessity
of attracting a specific caliber of business-minded,
professional employees to staff the Corporation.

Thus,

Congress issued broad guidelines for recruiting and
hiring what would be highly technical and specialized
staff from private industry.

The Act specified that

the SFC could hire up to 300 professional employees,
although total staffing has never peaked above 190^
employees.

The belief was that ceilings for salary

limitations had to be flexible and high enough in
order to induce the talented personnel desired.

It

was believed that those worth attracting would not be

interested in being indentured to the government's
overall GS rating system.

Therefore, the protection

and job security built into the Merit System would
have no great appeal.

Rather, the ideal staff was

envisioned as those who wanted to get a job done
quickly and leave for new challenges elsewhere.
Similarly, benefit packages, i.e. medical, retire
ment, savings plans, vacation times, and the like, had
to be competitive with private sector counterparts.
Therefore, the initial staff were given free rein to
construct many of the highly competitive benefits that
are in effect today at the Corporation, and which sur
pass most of those offered to personnel of government
agencies.
The powers of the Corporation are vested in a
Board of Directors comprised of a chairman and six
directors.

Members of the Board are appointed by the

President subject to confirmation by the U.S. Senate,
and serve seven-year terms.

The Chairman of the Board

serves as chief executive officer of the Corporation.
The existence of a Board of Directors is often a key
element in defining obvious differences between public
corporations and agencies.
Another important specification of the Energy
Security Act required the Corporation to submit to
Congress by mid-1984 a comprehensive strategy for

achievement of the national synthetic fuels production
goals.

The report, known as the Recommended Comprehen

sive Strategy

(RCS) was intended to consider all

practicable means for commercial production of synthetic
fuels and their relationship to national security, in
cluding the feasibility of utilizing synthetic fuels to
meet defense fuel requirements.

Among other issue, the

RCS was expected to address the economic and technolog
ical feasibility and environmental effects of projects
already funded by the Corporation as well as recommend
the dimensions of any continued federal role in the
development of a synthetic fuels industry.

Upon Con

gressional approval of the RCS, it was originally
proposed that the additional $68 billion would be
appropriated to implement the strategy.
On paper, the SFC appears to be an effective
approach for creating a synthetic fuels industry.
However, many issues and events since the organization's
creation have intercepted making the results less
than successful.

First of all, changing conditions

of world oil markets seriously displaced this infant
industry.

Secondly, the SFC has been used repeatedly

as a political football, particularly between the
Administration and Congress.

Third, although the

organization went to great lengths to recruit high
caliber staff, the SFC has been riddled with problems
concerning management and personnel.
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However, perhaps the idealistic intentions
originally conceived for the Corporation were in and
of themselves political pitfalls.

Ironically, the

elements that made the organization 'business-like*
and professional were also the issues that forced the
SFC straight into controversy within its first year
of business.

Within months, most of the highest paid

officers left under political fire surrounding the
issue of their salaries.

Moreover, in the years

following there has been a train of executives exiting
the Corporation for reasons which, of course, extend
beyond the salary and benefits controversy.

Generally,

the often alleged issue of poor management continues
to haunt the corridors of the organization.

However,

as may be proved by reviewing the SFC case, the desira
bility of congressionally mandating a Board of Directors
for all public corporations can be argued.

In the

Synfuels case, the Board is a highly politicized body,
often nothing more than a tool, shamelessly used by
Administration officials.
The RCS has still not been written.

The Policy

Development staff within the SFC which was discharged
with the mission of developing the RCS has since been
terminated and their floor space at the Corporation's
headquarters stands vacant.

Tom Corcoran, a newly

appointed Reagan Board Member now holds the reins for
producing the RCS document.
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The huge Great Plains project in North Dakota
scheduled to produce 21,000 BOED^ by 1988, is currently
struggling to close a deal with the politically delibera
tive Board of the SFC.

This project languishes for

numerous reasons, but primarily because the SFC in
herited it from the Department of Energy where the
project was awarded $2.02 billion in loan guarantees
in 1979.

Now, the project is requesting $820 million

in price guarantees from the SFC.

If such assistance

is not received, project sponsors threaten to abandon.
However, the real issue here is that the financial
term sheet between the SFC and the projects'

sponsors

has been agreed upon and in place since April 1984.

In

recent months, particularly, the tactic used by the SFC
Board seems to be one of continually stalling for time.
Simultaneously, the Great Plains project increasingly
is the focus of attention by 0MB, GAO, and various
Congressional

(oversight) Committees.

As the Corporation

has become more embroiled in bitter political controversy,
so has the Great Plains project.

Many observers be

lieve that the funding or non-funding of the project is
directly linked to the life or death of the SFC.
Unfortunately, at the time of this writing, in
mid-1985, few if any of the legislated SFC directives
have come to pass.

In the beginning,

it was feared

the environmentalists alone would impede the development

of the infant synfuels industry.

Instead, the sluggish

world oil market and the SFC, itself, have been the
spoilers.

The Corporation has suffered from a con

tinuous maze of economic and political miscalculations,
overpublicized

'scandals', poor management, and a weary

staff that is currently leaving in droves.

Although

there are already a few small experimental plants
making synthetic gas and oil

(including gasohol)

in

operation in the United States, the first large-scale
production from huge oil-shale deposits underlying
the high plains of the West, is a long way from being
operative.

After five years in business, the SFC has

managed to fund only three currently operating projects:
Cool Water, a small $120 million project, producing
electricity from coal gasification in California; Dow
Syngas, another coal gasification project in Louisiana;
and Union Oil, an oil shale project on Colorado's
western slope.
And yet, to date, the SFC has issued four different
commercial solicitations.

There are approximately ten

large-scale commercial projects that were submitted
for the Corporation's review and evaluation in earlier
solicitations that have either reached an impasse in
negotiations with the Corporation, are suffering from
various financial and technological travails of their
own, or are on the verge of withdrawing their
proposals completely.
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All of the above are simply a synopsis of the
symptoms and not the causes of why the SFC, an organiza
tion with a well-intentioned program, has failed to
accomplish so little in such a short time.

To determine

the causal reasons, a close examination of the SFC and
its corporate form deserve scrutiny.

If for no reason

other than academic exercise, this scrutiny is deserved
to determine why it is that some of our modern govern
ment institutions, no matter what their form, simply
are not working.
Issues and Problems
In order to understand why the SFC has not lived
up to its potential, we must consider several issues
and problems.

Throughout the remainder of this chapter,

the following areas relating to the case study will be
reviewed:

1) political and economic influences, 2)

managerial and organizational weaknesses,

3) staffing

and personnel problems, 4) poor enabling legislation,
5) questions of autonomy versus oversight, and 6)
Congressional liaisons.
Political and Economic Influences
"...(T)he establishment of a government corpora
tion is typically an action of high political visibility.
It is a conspicuous and symbolic way for elected
officials to appear to be 'doing something' about a
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problem; they appear to be taking hold and decisive
action.

Establishing a corporation especially appeals

to politicians when there appears to be crisis or some
other alarming change in objective conditions.

Such

circumstances preceded the moves to create...the
Synthetic Fuels Corporation."^
For decades, the relative expense had been the
main obstacle to the development of alternatives to
conventional fossil fuels

(oil, natural gas and coal).

Even as the economics of the overall energy situation
radically changed in the early 1970's, government had
refrained from adopting a synthetic fuels policy.
Many opponents objected to the feared environmental
effects and the huge public subsidies that would be
used for private energy projects.

However, in 1979

when the cutoff of Iranian oil put Americans back in
the gasoline lines, elective officials grew anxious.
It was President Carter who proposed that a government
corporation be created to encourage the construction
of synthetic fuel plants.

Congress quickly responded.

Unfortunately, many of the traditional reasons
underlying the choice of a corporate form by elective
officials were alive as the Energy Security Act was
being developed.

Elected officials recognize that

there is usually a large reservoir of political capital
to be utilized by the mere process of organization-
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building.

Also, such organizations are different and

newsworthy."...(T)hey provide their sponsors and support
ers with a welcome, well-publicized opportunity to
claim credit for responding to a tough situation in a
creative w a y ."^
Furthermore, the creation of the SFC as a public
corporation undoubtedly provided sponsors with a mech
anism to shift the blame onto someone e l s e 's shoulders,
namely corporation management, as problems have mounted.
After all, SFC management has had "independent" respon
sibility for handling synfuels development.

"Thus,

in 1980, legislators uncertain as to the costs and
benefits of a new set of allocation decisions passed
the politically difficult task of awarding governmentbacked loans to the Synthetic Fuels Corporation.
Of course, another political attraction for
utilizing the corporate form in Synfuels legislation
was most certainly to perform the function without
having the costs show up in the unified budget.
Considering the huge funds necessary for synfuels
development, this policy obviously held advantages
for sponsors of the Energy Security Act.

And elective

officials, generally, want to make federal budget
totals

(or deficits)

appear smaller than they really

are.
Also, it was easy for sponsors to elicit support
for synfuels in a corporate form due to the argument
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that such a complex undertaking had to be managed with
effectiveness and efficiency.

This was especially true

given the abbreviated decision time forced by the
impending "crisis",
A final dimension worth noting in reference to
the Synfuels case was the timely attitude toward use
of the government corporate form.

In the last two

decades as government intervention in industry, again,
became acceptable, the corporate concept has experienced
a tremendous resurgence, not known since the 1930's
and early 1940's.

Earlier skeptical observers have

ceased to believe through experience that such institu
tions are a sign of the "Red Menace" invading.

So on

all counts. Congress found easy arguments for justifying
a synfuels corporation.
However, all one has to do today is read the
press to realize the political potence showered on the
SFC of 1980 has reverted 180 degrees in 1985.

In many

respects, the Corporation has suffered from too much
advance billing, expectations caused by the passage
of time and the politics of the times.

It has been

advertised as an $88 billion institution, but its
actual authority in its initial period of operation
was only set to be between $15 billion - $20 billion.
Its purpose is to help the U.S. reduce its dependence
on six to eight million barrels per day of imported
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oil, but even its goal of "500,000 barrels per day by
1987 was almost surely unattainable.
Significantly, it has been billed as an institution
apart from government, but the Energy Security Act is
larded with detailed directions and prohibitions.

Such

circunstances have undoubtedly caused the SFC much
political strife, and to some degree or another has
directly impeded the Corporation toward accomplishing
its mandate.
While the politics that created and continues to
shape the SFC has been influential on its performance,
no discussion of the program would be complete without
addressing the overall economics involved, too.

The

international oil economy was fragile in the 1970's, but
as events have progressed, it appears that the ability
of the market place to redress the imbalance between
oil production and consumption requirements was under
estimated at least in the near-term.

And now that crude

prices have plummeted, it becomes increasingly difficult
to justify the currently projected prices of synfuels
per barrel equivalent.
Consequently, the SFC has not only suffered a
political battering, but an economic one, too.

Ultimately,

such political and economic realities have affected the
performance of the Corporation in a myriad of ways.
One result has been that the degree of support from
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the general public for a Federally sponsored, commerci
ally-oriented,

synthetic fuels program seems to have

diminished since 1981.

Diminished public support, how

ever, does not mean there is any less need for develop
ment of synthetic fuels.

The SFC, mindful of changing

public attitudes, has modified both its short and long
term objectives.

The law sets the years 1985-1995 as

the range for having a highly productive and cost
competitive industry, but much evidence today suggests
that realistically this goal could only be met in the
years 2000-2010.

The Chairman of the Board, Edward

Noble, writing in January 1983, stated:
"1982 was a fast-paced and pivotal year in the
shifting energy fortunes of all free world
countries, whether net energy producer or
consumer.
For synthetic fuels, especially, it
was a year of changing attitudes and adjustments.
Early illusions and exaggerated expectations were
replaced with much more realistic understanding
of the role of synthetic fuels in national
energy and economic policies."6
On a final note, potential project sponsors are
increasingly showing less interest in submitting their
project proposals for review and evaluation, staff
morale is at an all-time low, and a politically intangled
SFC Board seems defiantly résistent toward funding
projects currently before them.
Managerial and Organizational Weaknesses
From the outset, the SFC has suffered from
acknowledged internal management problems.

Recruited
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almost entirely from the private sector, the Corporate
leadership has found it difficult to adjust to the
complexities and ethical standards of Federal public
service.

Traditionally, SFC Board Members have had

the attitude that they did not wish to be contaminated
by government bureaucrats.

They have failed to recognize

that Congress and bureaucrats alone are not to blame for
the complexities of public service.
For example, the Sunshine Act undoubtedly has
contributed to the devisiveness of the Synfuels Board.
Functioning in an open setting has been difficult or
uncomfortable for many.

Although,

legally the Corpora

tion is not an agency or instrumentality of the Federal
Government, it is not in any way insulated from the
demands of the press. Congress, GAO, the Inspector
General, or the Freedom of Information Act.
to Ron Moe,

According

"Successive officers have repeatedly

employed private sector practices in Synfuels manage
ment, rather than those of a Federal agency, and run
afoul of 0MB, Congressional Committees, GAO, and the
press.
In August 1983, the President of Synfuels,
Victor Schroeder, resigned under fire regarding
accusations of mismanagement and improprieties of
office.

A Senate Government Affairs Subcommittee

found that the Synfuels President had awarded 51
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Consulting contracts without competitive bidding, some
of them to past business associates.

In the Washington

Post, Schroeder was quoted as saying,
"It makes no sense to put up personal services
for competitive bid.
Where else are you going
to find people to do work the way you need it
done, other than people you know or that someone
knows?"8
Also, regarding Schroeder, internal audit reports
indicated questionable uses of corporate funds, namely
charging $19,500 in broker's fees for the purchase of
his home to the Corporation's relocation fund.
mately, these funds were reimbursed.

Ulti

Anyway, the point

here is that since Synfuels does not operate under
standard federal rules, managers and employees enjoy
maximum discretion in behavior, checked only by cor
porate policies and possible publicity.
SFC supporters argue, however, that these freedoms
are essential to attract talented private sector people
and maintain the Corporation's highly autonomous
character.

Indeed, such freedoms may be necessary to

achieve its purposes.

In actuality, though, it would

be better and less costly policy to appoint leadership
who appreciates the balance between flexibility and
accountability.

Abuse of these managerial freedoms is

often nothing more than a severe lack of understanding.
Some experts in the study of public corporations
have a solution to managerial abuse which goes one step

farther:

eliminate the requirement for a board altogether

in the enabling legislations of public corporations.

In

its place, full leadership authority would be vested in
the CEO.

While such a concept initially sounds radical,

there are many government enterprises that do not have
a board of directors, or the board is simply ex officio
in nature, i.e. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.
Public enterprises in Japan

(there are 102 at the

national level) rarely have boards, and if one does
exist, they are never authoritarian, of course.
Unfortunately, in the U.S. the habit of assigning
public corporations a board is often an effort to
duplicate the organizational structure of private sector
counterparts.

However, in the public sector, the board

may simply become a caldron for political meddling,
especially when the members are political loyalists of
the Administration as in the Synfuels case.

Further

more, the SFC case displayed several times how the
progression of programs are easily stymied, if for any
reason a quorum is impossible.

Following Vic Schroeder*s

resignation as President in August 1983, other Board
Members continued to resign for various reasons, i.e.
conflict of interest, e t c .
and the Chairman were left.

Eventually, only one Member
It is fair to say that

most of 1984 for the SFC was void of any real decision
making capability.

In an election year, the Administration
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and Congress both were hesitant toward allowing the
Corporation to fund billion dollar projects, so the
necessary board members were deliberately not appointed.
Essentially, this case illustrates how an "independent"
corporation can be held hostage, as the use of a board
was abused by other governmental powers.
In conclusion, unless the board is ex officio,
use of this concept can be disasterous.

It is not

necessary, nor mandated by an act of Congress, and most
importantly, the board approach may have the potential
for insulation against sound public policy.

Management experts seem to agree that many cor
porations with excellent organizational structures
fail for lack of talented people and many corporations
with poor organizational structures succeed because
they have talented people.

At this point in its

history, the SFC needs its talented people and a sound
organizational structure built upon recognized manage
ment principles.

However, these elements alone will

not solve all the Corporation's management problems
without the essential added ingredient of strong
leadership.
Through most of its history, the SFC organizational
structure at the staff level, particularly, has been
sound.

Senior management has changed frequently without
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severely disrupting much of the daily staff functions.
Much of the credit for this phenomenon goes to the strong
matrix organization in operation.

It has functioned

adequately to achieve the objectives of the Energy
Security Act in project solicitation, evaluation, and
negotiation processes.

Indeed, if there are any dis

crepancies in the current structure, once again they
can be linked to higher management.

The case of the

Policy Development Group, given the mission to complete
the RCS, offers a clear example of this argument.
Although, the SFC Board had been directed by
Congress to formulate a strategic operational plan
regarding the RCS, management failed to grasp the
"operational" character of this guidance.

Instead,

early in the Corporation's history, management chose
to create a separate Policy Development office,
independent of the operational mainstream of the
Corporation.

Providing little guidance, it charged

that office with preparing a document to be presented
as the Corporation's proposed comprehensive strategy
to Congress.

Time elasped, and new management did not

effect significant organizational changes, even after
a quorum of the Board was finally reconstituted.
Thus, the planning function continued to be
isolated from the rest of the Corporation.

This

organizational separation was compounded by personality
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differences and ' t u r f

disputes which went unresolved

by senior management.

Under the direction of 3 success

ive vice presidents, the planning staff was left to set
its own course.

Their efforts were blown beyond

necessary proportions, requiring numerous outside
studies, which would have resulted in a report of massive
volume.
During all this time, the Board and Senior manage
ment had not focused on the progress of the strategy.
It wasn't until mid-1983, a year before the congressional
deadline for submittal, that Board Members expressed a
sense of concern about what the Policy Development Group
was doing.

Accordingly, the Board decided to become

directly involved by creating a Board oversight
committee.
Through the Board's involvement much of the
earlier RCS work was re-directed.

The Policy Development

Group originally had called for input from the Projects,
Technology and Engineering, and Finance Groups.

The

Board accepted this idea willingly, but ironically,
months passed before these Groups were contacted for
their inputs.

Indeed, much of the plans for the

development of the RCS have evolved without any con
tributions from other vice presidents.

This has been

unfortunate as the RCS cannot be effectively developed
without integrating the talents and knowledge of all
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the professionals within the SFC who have worked in the
synfuels program for the past few years.
Historically, the cooperation between the Policy
Development Group and other groups in the Corporation
has not been good.

The Vice President position of the

Policy Group was vacant for six months in 1983, and
at the close of that year the new Vice President was
announcing his resignation.

Corporation rumors held

that the Board was behind this resignation as the
individual was not leading the Policy Group in the
direction desired by the Board to complete the RCS.
Accompanying the difficulties caused by changing leader
ship had been a history of personnel upheaval.

The

staffing buildup, partially because of the initial
incorrect scoping of the mission, was too large and
included some skills duplicative of those already
existent in the Corporation.
In its final months, the Policy Group without a
vice president, attempted to secure closer cooperation
with other groups in the Corporation with indifferent
success.

For various reasons, the Policy Group had

difficulty getting substantial help from other offices
in the Corporation.

Again,

senior management did not

smooth out these obstacles, and did not issue directives
to assure that the Policy Group would get the kind of
assistance it needed as directed by the Board of Directors
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In November 1984, the Reagan Administration
finally appointed three additional Board Members, at
last giving the SFC the quorum it lacked for much of
that year.

Of course, the new directors appear to

reflect Reagan's traditional belief that energy alter
natives should only be developed through the free
market approach.

Consistent with this belief. Board

policies have been to self-impose even greater staffing
limitations than previous boards had planned.

As of

April 1, 1985, the last of the Policy Development staff
were terminated.

Only three other staff had previously

been absorbed elsewhere in the Corporation.

So by

executive design, it had been determined that given
the repeated problems of the Policy Group, and the
desire to achieve the image of operating a 'tight ship',
one board member alone would assume responsibility for
writing the RCS —

Tom Corcoran, a former anti-synfuels

Congressman, who bidded unsuccessfully for the Senate
in the 1984 elections.

The current draft circulating

the Corporation is a greatly scaled-down version of
what was initially imagined.

A strategy that has cost

the Corporation thousands of dollars and manpower
hours, has now been reduced to 30 pages, and will be
written by one individual.

The date for submission

to Congress is June 30, 1985, a one-year extended
deadline.
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Personnel and Staffing
A discussion of the SFC organization is not complete
without highlighting personnel issues, especially the
compensation and benefits package.

Indeed, queries on

personnel compensation issues are central to what has
brought the Corporation under so much attack.

They are

also central elements for evaluating the nature of a
government corporation, particularly in relation to
other similar federal entities.

But no other govern

ment corporation has been promised such a large amount
of public monies.

So from the beginning, the SFC was

totally enmeshed in partisan politics; and offering
seemingly "generous" salaries and benefits only
guaranteed that the Corporation would often be in the
limelight.
In the final days of the Carter Administration,
the President nominated John Sawhill as the first
Chairman of the Board and five others as members of
the Board.

These appointments were made during

congressional recess, and thus, had not been approved
by the Senate.

Congressional fury was only further

aggravated when the Chairman's salary was set at $175, 000
per year plus extensive fringe benefits.

The Senior

Vice President and General Counsel would be paid per
annum $150,000 and $140,000, respectively.

Similar

salaries were set for other high officials, plus
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generous mo v ?r r expenses, severance pay, and other
allowances.
These compensation packages, plus extraordinary
policy decisions by an unconfirmed Board of Directors,
sent Congress into a panic, prompting the House Environ
ment, Energy and Natural Resources Subcommittee to
conduct hearings.

In a very negative and not completely

accurate report, the Subcommittee summarized the feel
ings of many SFC opponents when it said that the Board
was "liberally dispensing salaries above executive pay
9
scale".
The Subcommittee felt that the Board had
ignored the restrictions on compensation by "offering
SFC officers lavish benefits far in excess of the
benefits" for Federal employees and "frequently out
stripping even those offered by major private
corporations".^^

These are debatable points and will

be discussed later, although they serve to underscore
the controversy surrounding the SFC's compensation/
benefits package.

SFC supporters, on the other hand,

agreed with the Board that salaries comparable to the
private sector were necessary to obtain the type of
talent needed.
After Reagan became President in early 1981, the
Board Members nominations were withdrawn and the officers
resigned, under pressure, or accepted lower salaries.
However, the Energy Security Act does allow the Board
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to establish a compensation schedule which can include
salaries higher than Level 1 of the Executive Schedule.
It was by using these guidelines, that the SFC's in
itial Board created several senior management positions
with salaries over $100,000 per year.

At the close of

1982, the Corporation had four officers paid salaries
(exclusive of substantial benefits)
for Cabinet Officers; President,
Vice President,

in excess of those

$135,000; Executive

$85,000; Vice President - Finance,

$85,000; and Vice President - Technology,
(Note;

$108,000.^^

Due mostly to organizational restructuring,

only the latter two positions remain above the 1984
Cabinet level salaries.

Of the former positions listed,

the first is currently vacant, the second no longer
exists).
It appears as though the early SFC Compensation
decisions were made over several months and in a piece
meal fashion.
employees'
1980.

The Corporation approved most of its

salaries during October and November of

In December of the same year, the relocation

assistance and general employee benefit packages were
approved.

It was not until January 1981 that Chairman

Sawhill told the rest of the Board about special bene
fits given to some of the SFC's officers— a package
that was never approved by the entire board.

12

At no

time during this process was the overall monetary value
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of the complete package r e v i e w e d . T h i s was an impor
tant mistake, giving opponents added ammunition.

The

value of compensation and benefits should be considered
together, not separately.

14

Whether or not the SFC's

compensation and benefits package was or is justified,
the way in which the Board went about evaluating and
setting compensation seriously jeopardized the new
package's credibility.
Before President Carter's interim Board departed.
Chairman Sawhill had contract with the consulting firm.
Towers, Perrin, Foster, and Crosby, Inc.

(TPF&C).^^

TPF&C was asked to design a "total compensation system,
including fringe benefits for the Chairman of the Board,
Directors, officers and employees of the Corporation".^^
The report, used to justify the SFC's new compensation
structure, was severely criticized.

The consultants

were attacked because there were so many recommended
positions above Executive Level 1.

Also, the report

did not compare the SFC with other quasi-governmental
or smaller private corporations.

Instead, salary com

parisons were made with giant private companies with
sales of $3 to $6 billion and with financial institu
tions with assets of over $10 billion.

Most of these

corporations had between 300 and 107,000 employees and
many had world-wide operations.

On the other hand, the

SFC, restricted to 300 professional employees, has only
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one line of investment, and may make no more than ten
to twelve financial arrangements.
While the TPF&C study was still in progress, the
SFC Board was already approving employee salaries
dubious action).

(a

The Board may have been uncomfor

table in setting compensation levels while the TPF&C
study was still incomplete, but needed to begin hiring
to get the Corporation up and running.

The Corporation

would use the TPF&C salary structure as a guide for the
next several m o n t h s .
President Reagan became directly involved with
the SFC for the first time when acting Chairman Sawhill
sent a memo to the White House on January 27, 1981
announcing the selection and salary of another position :
the $120,000 per year Vice President of Technology.
The memo also included the names of six Vice Presidents
appointed by the Board, describing their position titles
dates of appointment,

levels of compensation, prior

affiliation, and e d u c a t i o n . O n

February 25, 1981,

the President replied with a two-sentence memo to the
Corporation simply stating that he did not approve.
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Although the President's memo had only applied to the
V.P. for Technology, all but the V.P. for Planning said
they would abide by the then Executive Level 1 cap of
$69,630/year pending review by Reagan's new Board of
Directors.

The V.P.

for Planning continued to received
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$140,000 per year until his employment was terminated
on October 31, 1981.

Aside, from the $69,630 cap, the

Corporation continued to use the TPF&C salary struc
ture .
Soon afterward. President Reagan fired the inter
im Board, leaving the Corporation without a Board of
Directors and unable to function.

Unfortunately, the

President was slow in making his appointments.

The

Board would not be operational again until October 1981.
As this time, in an effort to dampen mounting con
gressional criticism, the Board again contracted with
a consulting firm to review the Corporation's salary
structure.

The Board, in attempting to strike a balance

between politics and business, emphasized two major
points when contracting with Hay Associates;
1) Congressional intent that a comparability
exist between the SFC salaries and Federal
Pay schedules; and
2) The Corporation's need to attract and retain
highly qualified and experienced personnel.
The Hay Associates'
tive.

approach was unique and crea

Briefly, each position was assigned a number of

points based on the analyses of three dimensions:
nical
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tech

knowledge, problem solving, and accountability.

Significantly, the consultants revealed that the $69,630
salary ceiling then in effect at the Corporation was
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inequitable because each of the six positions at this
level had different job difficulty scores.

Since the

Corporation's mission is project oriented, the in
dustrial sector was used as a guide to SFC salary
policy.

Hay Associates concluded that the Federal

General Schedule is not adequate for the SFC because
of the senior level salary compression.

Roe Moe, a

government corporation expert with the Congressional
Research Service, has expressed direct disagreement,
"A convincing case should be made before authority
is granted for salaries above Executive Level I of
the Federal

(S)chedule.

In most instances, corpo

ration executives should be included in the Senior
Executive Service."
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The consultants and SFC supporters suggest
this salary compression can result in problems at
tracting and retaining experienced private sector
personnel:
"The criticality of the Corporation's
mission would appear to warrant the
recruitment from various parts of
the private sector, especially the
industrial sector, of talented and
experienced individuals, many of
whom will already be employed with
competitively paying corporations."21
The Hay Report also noted that short-lived organi*
zations with no career futures,

like the SFC, usually

need more attractive compensation and benefits packages
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to get quality employees and keep them.
Based primarily on the Hay report, the SFC Board
approved a new compensation structure in February 1982.
For the most part, compensation levels were to remain
below Federal GS limits.

While the TPF&C study failed

to address comparisons with the General Schedule, Hay
Associates

(due to political pressure) made a special

point of considering it in determining SFC compensation
levels.

However, the Hay report's recommended compen

sation levels were only slightly less than those in the
TPF&C report.

Therefore, on a final note, the lower

compensation levels set by President Reagan's Board
were probably more a reflection of congressional and
executive pressures than any substantive differences
in the studies' results.
Now that some of the early events of the Corpora
tion's compensation history have been reviewed, it's im
portant to turn the provisions in the Energy Security
Act

(ESA), comparisons with other public corporations,

and the nature of the SFC, generally.

First of all, it

should be recognized that Section 117 of the ESA gives
the Corporation's Board the sole power to establish the
compensation for each individual officer.

In 1980, a

significant reason why Congress created the SFC in the
corporate form was to attract top talent.

Therefore,

the Board was given independent authority to set pay
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levels in excess of Federal salary scales, and r.establish a benefits program, including life insurance,
health insurance, disability, and a retirement plan
is fully vested after one year of employment).

(which

Overall,

Congress freed the Corporation from Federal Civil Service
restrictions.

Consequently, none of the SFC staff are

GS employees.

Such lenient directives in the ESA are

significant points in view of the fact that continuous
Congressional criticism has surrounded SFC personnel
issues.
Although the Act does direct that the Federal Govern
ment's Executive and General Schedules should be taken
into account for comparable positions, the Board does
have the authority to set salaries over the Executive
Level I.

If the President does not disapprove within

3 0 days, the salary rates become effective.

As a check on

the Corporation's non-officer employee salaries. Congress
simply required that the SFC identify, in its annual
report, those employees who are receiving more than $2,500
per month or $30,000 per year.

22

.

.

In many ways, it is

evident the law was written by a very different Congress
during a very different Administration from those currently
in office.
In comparing the SFC compensation package with other
quasigovernmental organizations, the Hay Associates report
should again be referenced.

In the report, the salaries

of six organizations were compared.

Each organization

operates, to a varying degree, as a private sector entity
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in a public sector environment.

"The similarity warrants

the analysis, even though the Congress has correctly
noted the differences between the SFC and other quasigovernmental corporations."
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Amtrack, COMSAT, Conrail,

Federal National Mortgage Association, the Student Loan
Marketing Association, and the Legal Services Corporation
were compared.

Each was created in whole or in part by

the Federal Government; each has received public funds;
and each has faced the need to attract and retain highly
qualified personnel.

Originally, Hay Associates had found

that while many of the lower level SFC positions were
perhaps over compensated, the higher level management
and policy positions were obviously under compensated.
The upward shift in upper management salaries implemented
as a result of the Hay recommendations, has made SFC
officer compensation comparable to some executives in other
quasi-governmental organizations.
However,

since the SFC has been so heavily criticized

regarding its compensation and benefits package, it
has often pointed to other quasi-governmental organizations,
stating the SFC should be given the same compensation
freedoms.

At one point, even Ed Noble, billionaire

Oklahoma oil man, long time Reagan loyalist and SFC Chair
man, tried to deflect such criticisms by accepting only
$1 in annual pay from the Corporation.

Somehow, though,

the 'point' of this never received the hoped for public
ity.

So the SFC pointed to the COMSAT Chairman who receives

a whopping $307,000 annual salary and the Conrail Chairman who
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receives $265,000 a year.^^

Of course, there are im

portant differences between the SFC and these public
corporations.

In its 1981 report, the House Environment,

Energy, and Natural Resources Subcommittee claims that
"Congress knowingly created a very different entity in
the Synthetic Fuels Corporation, and no comparisons
between COMSAT and Conrail can stand.
While keeping in mind that this report was very neg
ative and politically motivated,

it is true that both

the latter organizations are for-profit with non-public
directors and stockholders.

They receive much of their

income from non-governmental sources, pay taxes, and are
not subject to the Sunshine and Freedom of Information
Acts,

But to state,

Conrail

"no comparisons between COMSAT and

(and the SFC) can stand" is an absolute and,

therefore, indefensible statement.

Especially, in regard

to Conrail, which received Federal operating funds as
late as 1981 —

five years after operations began.

Not

only does the Federal Government own 85% of Conrail's
stock, but at one point, Conrail was losing $1 million
per day and was being heavily subsidized by public monies.
In fact, the Federal Government has pumped billions into
Conrail.

2

Therefore,

it seems the Subcommittee dis

played a short memory span while preparing this report.
By comparison,

the SFC*s FY'83 operation cost a

little less than $15 million.

While the Corporation is

allowed to spend $35 million a year for administrative
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expenses, such expenditures totalled only $14,754,436
in fiscal year 198 3 (see Appendix III).
for that year totalled $8,934,469.^^

Personnel costs

Thus, the Corpo

ration's policy of trying to rely on a small cadre of
highly qualified professionals seems to be saving millions
of dollars.

Moreover, current staffing is being further

cut by the process of attrition.

Which brings us back

to a central point— is it not warranted for the SFC to
competitively compensate highly skilled employees, espe
cially given the temporary nature of the organization?
The SFC cannot hire young engineers and train them for the
ten to twenty years it takes to reach the top of their
professions.

Necessary personnel must have a depth of

knowledge in areas like shale oil recovery and environ
mental technology.

A minimum of ten years experience,

demonstrating analytical and discretionary skills is a
28
must !

Without competitive salaries, recruiting such

candidates from the private sector can be difficult at
best.
The temporary nature of the Corporation undoubtedly
hinders the recruitment of high caliber candidates.

The

total compensation package of the SFC was geared toward
short-term employees who have presumably forfeited bene
fits accumulated after, perhaps, many years of service in
the private sector.

In order to fairly evaluate this

"generous" package, it is essential to understand it in
the proper perspective.

Indeed, these may be small costs
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for the government, if, in the long haul, synfuels
development could assure greater national security.
Poor Enabling Legislation
The public administration profile of the SFC is
quite unusual.

First of all, in organizational terms, the

status of the Corporation is ambiguous.

The Energy

Security Act states specifically that it is not an agency
or instrumentality of the U.S. Government.
is in no way a part of the executive branch.

Indeed, it
However,

understanding this designation proves difficult given the
nature of its mission, the close oversight by Congress,
the receipt of appropriated funds, and the use of the
Dept, of Treasury.

Similarly, arguing clearly that the

SFC is either more or less autonomous than other public
corporations,

is equally problematic.

Although Congress

exempted the SFC from most managerial controls, i.e., 0MB,
Congress also encumbered the organization with 26 pro
visions for the legislative veto.

Moreover, the ESA is

72 pages long, extremely detailed, and includes signifi
cant Congressional intervention in both broad and specific
policy making.
Since the SFC is not an agency of the U.S., none of
the government-wide laws apply to the organization unless
the ESA specifically states that they apply.

"No Federal

law shall apply to the corporation as if it were an agency
or instrumentality of the United States, except as
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expressly provided in this part."^^

This being the case,

there are numerous unusual provisions of law made appli
cable to the Corporation.
Among the government-wide statutes the SFC is not
subjected to are procurement, Freedom of Information,
Sunshine in the Government, privacy, and administrative
procedures.

However, the Act provides for variations

on several of these laws specifically applicable to Syn
fuels.

First of all, there is an "open meeting" clause

for Board meetings,

followed by methods in which the

Board may close the meeting.

The financial disclosure

provisions of the ethics in Government Act of 1978 are
applicable to officers and employees of the SFC "as if
it were a Federal a g e n c y . A l s o ,

much of the Freedom

of Information and Privacy Acts are integrated into the ESA,
The Davis-Bacon Act applies to the SFC and its clients
with respect to payment of wages to clerical and laborer
employees.

But interestingly, the SFC is not subject to

the Government Corporation Control Act of 194 5, discussed
in Chapter One.
In summation,

the ESA is a complex maze of grants

and restrictions of authority applicable to this one
Corporation.

Indeed, the SFC's poor and awkward enabling

legislation has often been cited as being at the core of
much of the Corporation's problems.

In practical terms,

it is impossible for the Corporation to create any
illusion of political or administrative accountability.
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It's legislation tends to run counter to such princi
ples.

Since the SFC is technically not an agency of the

government, 0MB has no managerial rules it can legally
enforce on the Corporation.

Rather, 0MB is left with

only the ability to expend political resources on the
Corporation, which has created a frustrated situation
at best.

This holds true especially in light of the fact

that 0MB's current Director has never supported the doc
trine behind the SFC's mission, and would just as soon
slash the program entirely in his deficit-cutting efforts
Such attitudes are undoubtedly further aggravated by the
reality that 0MB does not have authority to review the
SFC's annual administrative budget.

Thus, the relation

ship between the two organizations has been intermittent
and generally strained.

Currently, this environment is

evident in the evaluation of the Great Plains Project
of which 0MB is a p a r t .

Obstensibly, the 0MB has

become involved in SFC affairs because it is acting for
the President in fulfilling his responsibilities under
the A c t .
Questions of Autonomy Versus Oversight
Institutionally,

a difficult situation has emerged

in assuring the accountability of the Corporation.

Since

0MB is not allowed administrative control of the organi
zation, Congress is left to fill the void.

This has

meant holding numerous hearings, and issuing highly
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critical reports regarding the Corporation.

While

such Congressional tools are normally effective methods
of conducting political oversight, they are cumbersome
methods for administrative management.
According to the findings of the "Report on Govern
ment Corporations" cited in Chapter One, effective account
ability to Congress or an oversight agency cannot be
realized in administrative detail, but should concentrate
only on policy issues.

"It is foolish for Department of

Transportation officials to question the price of Amtrak
beer and soft drinks, but appropriate for them to consider
the corporation's total operating subsidy, the need for
individual routes, or the reasonableness of such major
costs as labor, capital equipment, and track maintenance."

32

Such an example is reminiscent of SFC Congressional
oversight.
Although the SFC does not have an oversight agency, the
ESA does seem to encourage institutional relationships
between the Corporation and Federal agencies.

The most

noteworthy of such relationships continues to be the
Department of Treasury.

The two organizations remain in

close contact with respect to the Corporation's borrowing
authority.

The SFC draws monies by issuing a noninterest-

bearing note payable to the U.S. Treasury, and due Septemb
er 30, 1997 or upon termination of the Corporation, which
ever date comes sooner.

From the budgetary perspective,

technically the SFC is a corporation both on-and off- budget
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—

another factor leading to political complications.

While the receipts and disbursements of the SFC are
presented annually in the Budget of the U.S. Government,
such expenditures are not included in Budget totals.
Placing SFC transactions off-budget was undoubtedly
done so legislators could disguise the huge outlays to
be allocated to the program.

Simultaneously, however,

the SFC must present to Congress an annual business-like
budget for administrative expenditures, which is subject
to the Congressional appropriations process.

While most

public corporations must present an annual business-like
budget

(as required by the Government Corporation Control

A c t ) , not all are subject to the Congressional appropri
ations process, an obvious method of oversight.

This is

usually a significant difference between government
corporations and agencies.
As the SFC requires funds to make payments to pri
vate firms, the monies will be issued from the Energy
Security Reserve, mentioned earlier in this chapter.
This is also an on-budget account administered by
Treasury.

But only after the funds are provided from

the Treasury, will the outlays be recorded in the Federal
budget.

In other words, SFC appropriations are on-

budget, while SFC transactions are off-budget.

Beyond

these functions, the ESA further describes what the role
between the SFC and the Treasury should be:

"(t)he
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Corporation,

in consultation with the Secretary of the

Treasury, shall insure to the maximum extent feasible
that the timing,

interest rate, and substantial terms

and conditions of any financial assistance will have the
minimum possible impact on the capital markets of the
United States, taking into account Federal activities
which directly or indirectly influence such capital
markets."
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In drafting the ESA, Congress was obvious

ly sensitive to the potential economic repercussions of
such huge outlays.
Although the Act clearly addresses this relationship
between Treasury and the SFC, it clearly does not address
any relationship between the Department of Energy
and the SFC.

(DOE)

Perhaps, this is due to the politically un

favorable climate surrounding DOE during the drafting of
the legislation.

Whatever the reason, SFC critics have

often suggested that the program would have been better
guided if DOE had either been appointed the oversight
agency, or if, simply, the SFC's program had been given
to DOE.

Of course,

SFC supporters argue, for reasons

already addressed elsewhere, why such an arrangement would
have been or would be disasterous to the commercial
nature of the synfuels program.

But the point to be made

here is the strong statutory autonomy that this legis
lative omittal places on the SFC.

Moreover, it is signi

ficant that such omittal further positions the Corporation
in a strong stance even with the Chief Executive,
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especially in the event of policy conflicts.

However,

for all the theoretical benefits of a public corporation
having much autonomy, the political realities in Washing
ton are such that ultimate survival is often difficult.
If the organization is small, like the SFC, not having
an oversight agency can seriously place the program in
the undesirable position of being all alone.
'beautiful' in Washington.

Big is

Alone, without an obvious

constituency, a program easily falls prey to the wolves.
An example of an also expensive, but politically shelter
ed program is Amtrak, which has DOT as its direct over
sight agency.
As is the case with essentially all public corporat
ions, the SFC is subject to audit by the General Account
ing Office

(GAO).

However, because the SFC is not covered

by the Government Corporation Control Act, its auditing
requirements are considered more stringent than those
required of other government corporations covered by the
Act.

Furthermore, the Synfuels Corporation is required

by the ESA to retain a firm of nationally reputed public
accountants to prepare "in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles" a report which includes
an audit of the Corporation's accounts "including state
ments of the type required in Section 106 of the Govern
ment Corporation Control Act."^

In practical terms,

however, the authority of GAO to audit the SFC seemingly
does not end here.

For the past two years, GAO staff
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have been permanently housed within the premises of the
SFC headquarters.

Their auditing responsibilities

have extended to include the financial evaluation of
the Great Plains Project, currently undergoing negoti
ations between the sponsors and the SFC.

Such evolved

circumstances undoubtedly are further evidence of the
tremendous oversight of the SFC.

Although such controls

were not initiated legislatively, they have emerged
loosely through the presumption that the Corporation or
its management are not responsible, and thus, need con
stant review.
Moreover, on a final note regarding oversight, the
SFC is the only public corporation that has been required
by law to house an inspector General

(IG).

Consequently,

the SFC is subject to many types of internal audits and
investigations.

Creation of the IG has undoubtedly

caused confusion as to where authority really lies.
Existence of such an office does not guarantee that re
ports of misconduct will be brought there.

If anything,

this office may only encourage suspicions of wrongdoing.
Observers generally agree that an IG can often aid
intra-organization destruction.
In conclusion,

for all its intentions for creating

a business-like, autonomous public corporation. Congress
was only successful at assuring many methods of over
sight of the SFC.

Congress may have exempted the SFC

from the benign Government Corporation Control Act,
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but in its place found numerous provisions for control,
i.e.,personnel ceilings, vast Congressional oversight,
creation of an IG, to name but a few.

The very fact

that the SFC was omitted from the Government Corporation
Control Act, may have made the organization more vul
nerable to be subject to numerous other laws and re
straints.

Of course, as noted above, many of these

oversight measures were not legislated, but have evolved
through time and politics.

Dwight Ink, long-time

Washington bureaucrat and former V.P. Administration at
Synfuels, has noted that 40% of his time at the Corpo
ration was spent in reacting to the GAO, the IG's Office,
the press or the p u b l i c . M u c h

supposed policy autonomy

becomes mute when such consequences of operating in a
public setting are weighed in.
Although a public corporation undoubtedly must have
some oversight to remain accountable, it is essential
that such a body be left to function flexibly in its
business environment.

There are numerous public corpo

rations where this balance has been more successfully
achieved than at Synfuels.

The presumed abuse by earlier

Synfuels management initiated precedents that are im
possible to reverse.

The current Board of Reagan appoin

tees have fallen victim to such politics.

Each Board

Meeting, they continually play to the media versus gett
ing on with the business at hand, like funding projects
before them.
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Congressional Liaisons
It is noteworthy that in the original proposal for
the Energy Security Corporation

(which became the SFC)

"the role of Congress in overseeing the Corporation
is not discussed...except to note that the Corporation
will report to the President and the Congress on its
financial operations on an annual basis or more frequently,

if necessary."
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The proposal states that it

will not be necessary to seek annual appropriations
since the authority will be provided at the time of the
organization's creation.

Essentially, this provision

encourages little contact between the management of the
Corporation and the relevant Congressional Committees.
So again, the ambiguities surrounding the organi
zational status and authorities of the Corporation con
tained obvious problems from the start, especially with
regard to its relations with Congress.

As noted earlier,

such inherent problems are undoubtedly due in part to
poor enabling legislation.

From the beginning, the legis

lation managed to leave many questions unanswered :

"Who,

for example, will have the authority to submit amend
ments to the law...?

Would amendments have to be approved

by the 0MB, as in the case with regular executive branch
agencies and most government corporations?

Or, can the

board submit its own proposals, even if they are at
variance with the wishes of the president?...

(W)ill
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Congress be able to effect a 'legistative veto' over
projects?"^®
Indeed, the original intention of the synfuels pro
posed legislation was to allow it to function with a
minimum amount of Congressional oversight.

This was

obviously drafted by a Congress which was trying to
appeal to presidential desires at the time.

However,

since the political climate is now very differenct in
both branches of government, this element of the law
has particularly frustrated Congress which continues to
react through disjointed efforts in its frantic attempts
to control the Corporation,

Consequently, the SFC is

stymied from moving forward with its business.

Thus,

the enabling legislation has proved problematic from
all perspectives.
Shortly after the Corporation's inception, and fol
lowing President Reagan's landslide victory in 1980, the
new Congress began scrutinizing the SFC.
the tone up to the present —

This has set

the political timing has

always been off for the Corporation.

Congress has con

tinually delivered a negative message regarding the SFC,
whether related to Board Members and management, personnel
policies, or project funding.

Obstensibly, Congressional

arguments have always been lack of accountability and
bad economics, but it is clear that simple ideological
differences have also played a major role in diminishing
the SFC.
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Along these lines, however, little substantive
action was taken by Congress the first couple of years.
But as the 1984 election approached and deficit-cutting
pressures multiplied, the Congress and the White House
finally compromised on a 5.2 billion cut from synfuels
obligational authority.

Previously, 2 billion had been

cut from the $17 billion Energy Reserve Account, which
was given to social programs.

This final compromise

was the result of munerous proposals over the previous
year, deriving mostly from the House, to reduce the bud
get authority of the SFC.

Of particular interest among

these proposals was Representative Tom Corcoran's
(R-IL) proposed bill to reduce the Corporation's loan
authority to $3 billion.

(As the top-ranking Republican

on the House subcommittee that has jurisdiction over
synfuels, in 1982, he also introduced legislation that
would have totally abolished the Corporation).

His

proposed legislation would have also limited the SFC
to research and development, a very tired solution.
Although the measure acquired eleven co-sponsors, it,
apparently, never went beyond committee hearings.
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But the significance of this proposal is its author, who
a little over a year later was appointed to the SFC
Board by the Reagan Administration.

Corcoran has since

positioned himself as Vice Chairman of the SFC Board,
a new, fully-salaried position which is present in the
daily operations of the Corporation.

Observers note that
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following his lost bi: for the Senate, this position
simply will provide him with a Washington base while
giving him high visibility in Illinois since he obvi
ously plans to run for the Senate again.
As noted,

in 1984, the Corporation's Board had lacked

a quorum since April, so in August, the Senate acted on a
compromise proposal with the White House.

{Administration

officials had insisted since May that they would not re
store a Board quorum until Congress substantially reduced
the SFC's funding).

Finally, the Administration agreed to

present a list of Board nominees in exchange for immediate
cuts of $5.2 billion.

As noted earlier in this chapter,

this is an unfortunate example of how the Corporation's
Board and its operations were held hostage over the
Administration's political maneuverings.
However, in November,

just prior to a Congressional

recess, the Senate and the White House still had not
agreed on the list of nominees.

In particular Corcoran's

nomination was at issue in the Senate.

Furthermore, al

though Corcoran and the two other names (Paul MacAvoy and
Eric Reichl) were submitted for nomination in October,
they came too late for the Senate to complete the confir
mation process before adjournment.

So the President,

using his powers of office, gave "recess appointments
to the three nominees, which would enable them to serve
until the end of 1985 without being confirmed.

But a

six-month legislative battle over SFC funding and Board
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nominations had been laid to rest, at least tempo
rarily.
In summation,

it must be concluded from Corcoran's

appointment that more than mere irony was at work here.
Last year, the Administration initially had proposed
to cut the SFC by $9.5 billion.

Since the White House

was forced to compromise, particularly with the Senate,
by settling for a lesser cut, Corcoran's appointment was
undoubtedly a measure at the Administration's disposal
to further diminish the program.

Many observers, in

cluding SFC Chairman Edward Noble, questioned whether
the White House might have had other ulterior motives
than that of giving the Board the necessary quorum to
take action on pending synfuel projects.
Moreover, as an aside note, it is interesting that
for all the legislative energy put forth last year by
both Congress and the Administration,

the 1984 Republi

can Party platform was totally silent on Synfuel Corpo
ration cuts, and synfuels development in general.
"Indeed, the party's entire plank on energy policy con
sists of only six sfiort paragraphs,

which primarily

praises the Administration's decontrolling of oil
prices.
Meanwhile, Mr. Corcoran, now the SFC Vice Chairman,
has ceased to push for abolition of the Corporation.
Rather, he now argues that it "would be a serious mistake
to abolish the S F C . A n d ,

in reference to DOE's
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program for research and development that operated before
creation of the SFC, the Vice Chairman remarks,
billions with nothing p r o d u c e d . I n d e e d ,

"spent

Corcoran

now maintains that the Corporation is essential; partic
ularly,

he argues since the production goals of

500,000 barrels per day by 1987 and 2 million barrels
per day by 19 90 were eliminated in the legislation
approved last year.

Amazingly, one of the S F C ’s great

est political foes, has now become a political ally of
the newly scaled-down program.
In current Congressional relations, the Vice Chair
man has played his new role with zeal.

The most obvious

of anti-synfuels legislation now being proposed is an
SFC-abolition amendment to be attached to the House's
fiscal year 1986 budget resolution.
Dingell

Congressmen John

(D-MI) Chairman of the House Energy Committee

and Mike Synar

(D-OK) propose to abolish the Corporation

and transfer $500 million of its funding to DOE.

Power

ful support for this amendment is currently massing in
the House.

But Corcoran has recently opposed such a

proposal, maintaing that without the Corporation, the
Federal government’s synthetic fuels effort would revert
to "Pork-barrel p o l i t i c s . M o r e o v e r ,

the Vice Chair

man justifies his new attitude toward the SFC by arguing
to Congress that its requested mission will be accom
plished using "significantly less"^^ than the currently
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available $8 billion.

He further assures Congress

that the program will not request the additional $68
billion authorized for the originally proposed second
phase of synfuels development.

Should the Synfuels Corporation be Saved?
There are undoubtedly numerous reasons why the U.S.
Synfuels program should be saved.

But, of course, the

obvious reason of many synfuels proponents is national
security.

"There is today only a nine-year supply of

oil in the United States."
Schlesinger,
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According to James

former Secretary of Energy in the Carter

Administration,
and complacency.

"This country vacillates between panic
We're in a complacency period right

now and that is going to induce another panic."
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Indeed, it is hard to imagine energy shortages and
gas lines.

However, although OPEC has been partially

replaced by other importers, and U.S. oil consumption
of imported oil is only 30 percent today versus 4 7
percent in 1977,^^ imports did rise last year by 6.5
percent for the first time since 1979.

When demand

was falling, the chronic problem of U.S. production not
meeting demand, was only masked.

Moreover, gasoline

imports are rising even faster than imports of crude oil,
jumping by 30 percent last year alone.

48

Evidence pointing to the growth of U.S. dependence
on oil and gas imports abound, and obviously exceed far
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beyond the necessary realm for discussion here.

Rather,

what is at issue is the continued necessity for develop
ment of alternative fuels— and possibly even at the
expense of encouraging uneconomic projects.

In the long

run, the experience gained from such "economic failures"
may well pay for themselves again and again.

This argu

ment has undoubtedly held true for many infant industries
around the world and through time.

Furthermore, con

tinued U.S. investment in and greater reliance on alter
native energy sources surely will free this country from
the many foreign policy constraints that make our national
security so vulnerable.

Such investment would seem pre

ferable to further military build-up, though not as
politically expediate, perhaps.

In summary, Daniel

Yergin, President of Cambridge Energy Research Associates,
has remarked,

"A lot of progress has been made.

But

after what we've been through, it would be foolish (to
49
ignore) recurrent questions about energy security."
Congress and the Corporation itself have already
taken significant steps toward minimizing the scale of
the synfuels program.

Of course, opponents of the SFC

hope to take this measure one step further, and enve
lope what remains of the organization within DOE's
structure.

Such a final solution seems drastic and

certainly unnecessary.

Proponents of the program could

argue that as long as financial assistance is being
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awarded in the commercial sector, the program should
remain in the corporate form.

After all, attacks on

the SFC have not necessarily been a fault of the corpo
rate form.

More accurately, the SFC's poor enabling

legislation may be blamed for political confusion, and
therefore, controversy and criticism.
Attacks on the SFC also reflect deep divisions
througlTOut the country on the role of government in the
development of alternative fuels.

Thus, it is likely

that a synfuels program packaged in any form would have
drawn the same critical scrutiny.

Indeed, considering

the potential advantages that can be realized through
the use of the public corporation, the issue here may
well be how to assure that the next synfuels corporation
be saved from a similar fate.

The previously addressed

arguments for establishing public corporations may be
especially poignant when the government wishes to en
courage a new industry commercially.

Public corporations

should,in theory, be an ideal median for creating a new
public function immediately, and generally, they are
easier to dismantle than the entrenced bureaucracies that
come from creating core agencies.
Therefore, the organizational form may be relative
at most to the travails of the SFC.

Having said that,

however, most observers would agree that had the synfuels
program been buried within a bureau of DOE, for example,
it is unlikely it would have attracted so much unwanted
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attention.

But given the importance ot its mission to

the country, the Corporation's project orientation, the
experienced personnel required, and the short time
frame given to reach its goals, such an organizational
form was certainly needed and can be justified.
The Corporation's Future
From May until October of 1984, while Congress
debated its future, the Synthetic Fuels Corporation was
essentially an organization without a future.
the situation became clear:

Finally,

$5 billion would be cut

from the SFC, leaving only $8 billion.

These cuts

meant that the latest projects could not be funded.
Earlier eligible projects would use up all of the re
maining $8 billion.

So throughout the summer and early

fall of 1984, the SFC personnel had simply been going
through the motions —

wasting their time on projects

that would never be funded.
Unfortunately, this wasted effort was only a part of
a continuous chain of attacks on employee morale.

Earli

er in the Corporation's history, SFC staff felt they were
"on a mission" to help develop a national alternative
fuels industry.

There was a true

'esprit de corp,'

and much pride taken in working long hours, all of which
this author was a part.

But falling oil prices, abuse

from the Administration, attacks in the press. Congress
ional politicking,

lack of private sector support, and
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working without seeing any tangible results have caused
many private-sector oriented staff to leave in droves.
Recently, this tragic phenomenon alone has the Cor
poration undergoing rapid evolution.

Moreover, the

SFC "becomes more and more crippled with each passing
week as its Congressional opponents prepare to move in
for the final kill."^^

Indeed, many Washington observers

claim the Corporation is being deliberately ushered into
such a position of inoperation so that abolition will be
just a formality.
Until recently, the future of the organization was
not quite so gloomy.

Some staff even predicted that

current projects would be funded over the next year:
then a reduced organization would go into the monitoring
phase under the wing of an oversight agency, perhaps.
But increasingly budget reductions are the overriding
Congressional concern; even though killing the Corpo
ration would not produce anything like an $8 billion
reduction in the 1986 b u d g e t . H o w e v e r ,

warnings that

the drive to kill the SFC should be taken seriously, are
now coming even from the Senate.

While Congressional

opposition has generally come from the House, these
warnings recently came from the majority side on the
Senate Energy Committee.

But as recently as early May,

the top-ranking Democrat of that Committee, J. Bennett
Johnston

(D-LA)

stated,

"You're our baby.

Takes two
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Houses to change anything.

The only other committee

where changes could take place is Appropriations, and
you'll see the same faces there."
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It's anybody's guess where all this will leave
Vice Chairman Corcoran's new scaled-down program.

Cor

poration opponents tend to think his reform movement will
be trampled by the efforts to complete the SFC's
business before the ax falls.
Considering all of the above, and the very real
possibilities of future oil shocks, how can Congress im
prove the mechanisms for the next SFC?

And, can the

next SFC carry out its responsibilities without experi
encing the same kinds of demoralizing attacks?

Until

the country reaches a concensus on a national energy
policy the answer has to be "no."
Perhaps after the next oil shock. Congress can
establish a COMSAT for energy.
corporation could build and sell

A completely private
(or operate)

synthetic

fuel plants, with the idea that it is a 'for profit'
corporation.

Whatever type of corporation emerges from

the next oil shock, it must be left alone to carry out
its responsibilities.

It is ironic that just as the

SFC had seemed to establish an effective and responsible
program, a variety of forces worked to negate it.

CHAPTER THREE;

FOOTNOTES

^This number includes non-exempt or support level staff
and represents total SFC staffing at mid-year 1984.
in
comparison to original Congressional intention, this figure
represents gross under staffing by a politically insecure
organization that was initially conceived as employing 300
professional staff by FY '84.
2

BOED is used to express synfuel 'Barrels of Oil
Equivalent (to crude oil) produced per Day*.
^John T. Tierney, "Government Corporations and Managing
The Public's Business," Political Science Quarterly 99 (Spring
1984):77.
^I b i d , p. 78.
^I b i d , p. 78.
Annual Report of the United States Synthetic Fuels
Corporation, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Synthetic Fuels Corp
oration, 1983), p. 4.
Roles and Management of Government Corporations"
Seminar, The National Institute of Public Affairs, Ron Moe,
panelist. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress,
Washington, D.C., October 23, 1984.
^Howard Kurtz, "Synfuels President Under Fire; Three
Directors Seek Ouster," Washington P ost, 9 August 1983, sec. A,
p. 1.
^U.S., Congress, House, Oversight of the Energy Security
Act: Implementation of the Synthetic Fuels Corporation, 97th
Cong., 1st sess., 1981, p. 12.
^°I bid, p. 12.
^^Annual Report of the United States Synthetic Fuels
Corporation, (Washington, D.C.; U.S. Synthetic Fuels Corp
oration, 1983), p. 31.
^^U.S., Congress, House, Oversight of the Energy Security
A c t , p. 18.
p. 18.
97

98

14

Robert D. Lee, Jr., Public Personnel Systems,
imore, MD; University Park Press, 1979), p. 85.

(Balt

^^U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, United States Synthetic Fuels Corporation; Evaluation of
Administrative Procedures at the Synthetic Fuels Corporation
18 October 1982.
^^U.S., Congress, House, Oversight of the Enerav Securitv
-------A c t , p. 14.
^^U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to the Chair
man, United States Synthetic Fuels Corporation, p.27.
1R

I b i d , p. 28.

^^I bid, p. 29.
^^Ron Moe, Federal Government Corporations: A Quest
For A Theory (Washington, D.C.; Congressional Research Service,
Library of Congress [1982]), p. 19.
21

U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to the Chair
man, United States Synthetic Fuels Corporation, p. 30.
22

Annual Report of the United States Synthetic Fuels
Corporation, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Synthetic Fuels Corp
oration, 1983), p. 15.
23

Personnel Compensation and Benefits Recommendations
to the United States Synthetic Fuels Corporation, by Hay
Associates (Washington, D.C.: Hay Associates, 1981), p. 35.
^^U.S., Congress, House, Oversight of the Energy Security
A c t , p. 9.
Z^i b i d , p. 9.
^^Stan Kulp, "Conrail's Future: It May Be Brighter than
the Deficit-Ridden Past," Barrons (June 22, 1981): 9 ,20,2 2 .
^^Annual Report of the United States Synthetic Fuels
Corporation, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Synthetic Fuels Corp
oration, 1983), p. 23.
^ ^U . S ., Congress, House, Synthetic Fuels Development,
97th C o n g . , 1st ses s . , 1981, pp. 21-22.

99
29

U.S., Congress, Senate, The Energy Security Act,
Public L. 96-294, 96th Cong., 2nd sess., 1980, S. 932,
p. 59'
^°I b i d , p. 59.

Seminar,
Seidman,
tration,
October

"Roles and Management of Government Corporations"
The National Institute of Public Affairs, Harold
Author and Scholar; Dwight Ink, Former V.P. Adminis
U.S. Synthetic Fuels Corporation, Washington, D.C.,
23-25, 1984.

32

Report on Government Corporations, by Alan Dean,
Chairman (Washington, D.C.: The National Academy of Public
Administration, 1981), p. 47.
33

U.S., Congress, Senate, The Energy Security A c t ,
Public L. 96-294, 96th Cong., 2nd sess., 1980, S. 932,
p. 47.
^^I b i d , p. 67.
Roles and Management of Government Corporations"
Seminar, The National Institute of Public Affairs, Dwight
Ink, panelist. Former V.P. Administration, U.S. Synthetic
Fuels Corporation, Washington, D.C., October 24, 1984.
Interview with Dwight Ink, Former V.P. Adminis
tration, U.S. Synthetic Fuels Corporation, Washington, D.C.,
24 October 1984.
37

Ron Moe, "Government Corporations and the Erosion
of Accountability: The Case of the Proposed Energy Security
Corporation," Public Administration Review 39 (November/
December 1979): 569.
^^I bid, p. 569.
^^William Rankin, "Corcoran Has Eleven Co-Sponsors,"
The Synfuels Report (March 28, 1983):4.
Republican Platform Silent on SFC, Hails Reagan's
Decontrol of Oil Prices," Synfuels (Washington, D.C.: McGrawHill, August 24, 1984), p. 2.
"SFC Board Member, Critic Debate Need for Continued
Existence of Agency," Regulatory and Legal Developments
(Washington, D.C.: The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.,
April 2, 1985), p. A-2.

100
42

Ibid, p. A-2.

^^I bid, p. A-2.
44

I bid, p. A-2.

45

Daily

Armand Hammer, "Synfuels Must Start Now," The Oil
(April 19, 1985): 4.

^^Richard B. Schmitt, "U.S. Dependence on Oil, Gas
Imports May Grow," Wall Street Journal, 23 April 1985, sec. 1,
p. 6.
^^I b i d , p. 6.
^^Ibid, p. 6.
49

I b i d , p. 6.
"Experience, But at a Price," The Oil Daily (May 17,

1985):4.
^^Lawrence Paulson, "Budget Cut Drive Threatens SFC
Future, Corporation Told," The Oil Daily (April 15, 1985):12.
52

U . S . , Congress, Senate, Committee on Energy, The
Future of the U.S. Synthetic Fuels Corporation, 98th Cong.,
2nd sess., 1985. (Quotes from J. Bennett Johnston (D-LA),
top ranking Democrat of Senate Energy Committee).
^^Paulson,
p. 12.

"Budget Cut Drive Threatens SFC Future,"

BIBLIOGRAPHY
I ) . Books ;
Allen, George R.
The Graduate Students* Guide To Theses &
Dissertations. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Pub
lications, 1973.
Ballou, Stephen V.
A Model for Theses & Research Papers.
Boston, MA: Houghton Miffling Co., 1966.
Bennis, Warren G.
American Bureaucracy.
Transaction Books, 1970.

New Brunswick, NJ:

Benveniste, Guy.
Bureaucracy. San Francisco, CA: Boyd & Fraser
Publishing Co., 1977.
Bennett, James T. and Dilorenzo, Thomas J. Underground Govern
ment : The Off-Budget Public Sector. Washington, D.C.:
Cato Institute, 1983.
Berkley, George E.
The Craft of Public Administration.
Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon, Inc., 1978.
Bozeman, Barry.
Public Management & Public Analysis. New
York City: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1979.
Bresnick, David.
Public Organizations and Policy.
IL: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1982.

Glenview,

Charlesworth, James C.
Theory and Practice of Public Adminis
tration; Scope, Objectives, and Methods. Lancaster, PA:
The American Academy of Political and Social Science,
1968.
Dimock, Marshall E. and others.
Public Administration.
(Fifth Edition). New York City: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, Inc., 1953.
Falcione, Raymond L.
A Guide to Better Communication in
Government Service. Glenview, I L : Scott, Foresman
and Co m p a n y , 1984.
Frederickson, H. George.
New Public Administration. Uni
versity, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1980.
Friedman, W. and Garner, J. F . (Eds.) Government Enterprise;
A Comparative Study. New York: Columbia University
Press, 1970.
Goldberg, Sidney D. and Seidman, Harold. The Government Corporation: Elements of a Model Charter. Washington, D.C.:
Public Administration Service, 1953.
101

102
Golembiewski, Robert T. and Eddy, William B. (Eds.) Orqanization Development in Public Administration. Part I.
New York City: Marcel Dekker, Inc., 1978.
’
Gordon, George J.
Public Administration in America. New
York City: St7 Martin's Press, Inc., 1982.
Gross, Bertram M.
Organizations and Their Managing. New
York City: The Free Press, 1964.
Hargrove, Erwin C. and Conkin, Paul K. (Eds.) TVA - Fifty
Years of Grassroots Bureaucracy. Urbana, IL: Univer
sity of Illinois Press, 1983.
Lambro, Donald.
Washington: City of Scandals. Boston, MA:
Little, Brown and Company, 1984.
LaPalombara, Joseph.(Ed.) Bureacracy and Political Develop
ment . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963.
Lee, Robert D. Jr. Public Personnel Systems. Baltimore, MD:
University Park Press, 1979.
Lilienthal, David E.
TVA - Democracy on the March. New York:
Harper and Bro s . , 1944.
Mailick, Sidney and Van Ness, Edward H. (Eds.) Concepts and
Issues in Administrative Behavior. Englewood Cliffs,
N J : Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962.
McDiarmid, John.
Government Corporations and Federal Funds.
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1938.
Medeiros, James A. and Schmitt, David E. Public Bureaucracy:
Values and Perspectives. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publish
ing Co., Inc., 1977.
Medina, William A. Changing Bureaucracies. New York City;
Marcel Dekker, Inc., 1982.
Meyer, Marshall W. Change in Public Bureaucracies. Cambridge,
England: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
Millett, John D. Management in Public Service. New York City:
McGraw-Hill, 1954.
. Organization for the Public Service- Princeton, NJ:
D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1966.
Morrow, William L. Public Administration: Politics and The
Political System. New York City: Random House, 1975.
Morstein-Marx, Fritz. (Ed.)
Elements of Public Administration,
Englewood C l i f f s , N J : Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1946.

103

Musolf, Lloyd. Uncle Sam's Private, Profitseeking Corporations
Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1983.--- -------O'Donnell, Maurice E. (Ed.)
Readings in Public Administration
Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1966.------ -----------Persons, Warren M. Government Experimentation in Business.
New York City: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1934.
Pritchett^ C . Herman. The Tennessee Valley Authority: A Study
1943^^^^^ ^^^^^^stration. New York: Russell & Russell,
Pursley, Robert D . and Snortland, Neil. Managing Government
Organizations. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing, Inc.,
1980.
Reagan, Michael D. The Administration and Public Policy.
Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1969.
Seidman, Harold. Politics, Position and Power: The Dynamics
of Federal Organization. New York City: Oxford Univer
sity Press, 1976.
Selznick, Philip. TVA and The Grass Roots. New York City;
Harper and Row, 1966.
Shafritz, Jay M. The Public Personnel World. Chicago, IL;
International Personnel Management Association, 1977.
Sharkansky, Ira. Public Administration. Chicago, IL; Markham
Publishing Company, 1970.
. Wither the State? Politics and Public Enterprise
in Three Countries. Chatham, N J : Chatham House, 1979.
Simon, Herbert A. and others. Public Administration. New
York City: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956.
Turabian, Kate L. A Manual For Writers of Term Papers, Theses
and Dissertations. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press, 1973.
Waldo, Dwight (Ed.) Ideas and Issues in Public Administration.
New York City: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1953.
Walsh, Annmarie Hauck. The Public's Business: The Politics
and Practices of Government Corporations. Cambridge,
MA: The M.I.T. Press, 1978.
Zawacki, Robert A. and Warrick, D. D. Organization Development: Managing Change in the Public Sector. Chicago,
IL: International Personnel Management Association,
1976.

104
II). Articles:
Free Market Infusion for Synfuels Corporation." BusinessWeek.
13 April 1981, p. 46-47.
------------"A Desperate Search for Synthetic Fuels." BusinessWeek. 30 July
1979, p. 57-60.
^
"A Swift About-Face on Aid to Synfuels." BusinessWeek.
1982, p. 26-27.---------------------------- -------------

9 Auaust

Annual Report of the United States Synthetic Fuels Corporation.
Washington, D . C . : U.S. Synthetic Fuels Corporation, 1983.
"Breakthrough or Boondoggle?" Roscoe C. Born. Barrons.
1980, Vol. 60, p. 9+.
-------

11 August

"Budget Cut Drive Threatens SFC Future, Corporation Told."
Lawrence Paulson. The Oil D aily. 15 April 1985, p. 12.
"Carter Appoints Interim Synfuels Corporation Board." Oil &
Gas Journal. 13 October 1980, p. 94.
"Changing Public-Private Sector Relations: A Look at the United
States." Bruce L. R. Smith. The Annals of the American Academy
of Political and Social Science. March 1983, 466:149-164.
"Compromise Calls for $5.2 Billion Cut in Synfuels Budget."
Andy Pasztor. Wall Street Journal. 25 September 1984, sec. 1,
p. 2.
"Conrail's Future; It May Be Brighter than the Deficit-Ridden
Past." Stan Kulp. Barrons. 22 June 1981, p 9, 20, 22.
"Corcoran Eyed as Candidate for SFC Board." Inside Energy with
Federal Lan d s . 23 July 1984, p. 1.
"Corcoran Has Eleven Co-sponsors." William Rankin. The Synfuels
Report. 28 March 1983, p. 4.
"Corcoran in Line for Synfuels Job." James Worsham. Chicago
Tribune. 29 July 1984.
"Experience, But at a Price." The Oil Daily. 17 May 1985,
p. 4.
"Exxon's Exit Doesn't Spell Synfuels' Doom," William H.
Miller. Industry W e e k . 28 June 1982, p. 21-22.
"Fading Dream: Without Big Changes, Synthetic Fuels Corp.
Seems Likely to Perish." Andy Pasztor. Wall Street Journal.
9 August 1984, sec. 1, p. 1.
Federal Government Corporations: A Quest For A Theory. By
Ron Moe. Washington, D . C . : Congressional Research Service,
Library of Congress, 1982.

105
"Government Corporations: A Focus of Policy and Administration."
Marshall E . D imock. American Political Science Review. October
1949, 43:916.
'
"Government Corporations and Managing the Public's Business."
John T. Tierney. Political Science Quarterlv. Sorina 19R4.
99:73-92.
"
^
"Government Corporations and the Erosion of Accountability:
The Case of the Proposed Energy Security Corporation."
Ronald C. Moe. Public Administration Review. November/
December 1979, 39:566-571.
"
"Government and Public Enterprises - The Budget Link."
A. Premchand. Finance and Development. December 1979, p. 2730.
"Government-Sponsored Enterprises in the United States."
Harold Seidman. The New Political Economy; The Public Use
of the Private Sector. (Ed.) Bruce L. R. Smith. London:
Macmillan Co., 1975.
"House Rejects Plan to Gut SFC Program, Approves $5 Billion
Recission."
Synfuels in Washington. 6 August 1984, p. 1.
"How the Government Evades Taxes." James T. Bennett and Thomas
J. Dilorenzo. Policy Review. Winter 1982, p. 71-89.
"Human Service Matrix: Managerial Problems and Prospects."
C. E. Teasley and R. K. Ready.
Public Administration Review.
March/April 1981, 41: 261-267.
"Management in the Third Sector." Michael E. McGill and
Leland M. Wooton (Eds.) Public Administration Review.
September/October 1975, 35:444-455.
"Nonprofit Intermediaries: Symtom or Cure?" Harold Seidman.
Government-Sponsored Nonprofits. Washington, D.C.: National
Academy of Public Administration, 1978.
Office of the Inspector General Management Audit. Washington,
D . C . : U.S. Synthetic Fuels Corporation, 1983.
"Organization Change in the Third Sector." Craig C. Lundberg.
Public Administration Review. September/October 1975, 35:472477.
Personnel Compensation and Benefits Recommendations to the
U.S. Synthetic Fuels Corporation. By Hay Associates.
Washington, D . C . : Hay Associates, 1981.
"Public Enterprises in the USA." Harold Seidman. Annals— of
Public and Co-operative Economy. March 1983. Vol. I.

106
Report on Government Corporations. By Alan Dean, Chairman.
Washington, D . C . : The National Academy of Public Adminis—
tration, 1981.
Report to the Congress by the General Accounting Office.
"Congress Should Consider Revising Basic Corporate Control
Laws." Washington, D . C .: Government Printing Office, April 6,
1983.
"Republican Platform Silent on SFC, Hails Reagan's Decontrol
of Oil Prices." Synfuels. 24 August 1984, p. 2.
"Rising Imports Show Need for Synfuels, Council Tells White
House." Synfuels in Washington. 11 June 1984, p. 2.
State Public Corporations; A Guide to Decision Making. By
Annmarie Walsh. New York City: Institute of Public Adminis
tration, 1983.
"SFC Board Member, Critic Debate Need for Continued Existence
of Agency." Regulatory and Legal Developments. Washington, D.C.
The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 2 April 1985.
"SFC Could Lose $10 Billion Under New Administration Proposal."
Synfuels in Washington. 20 August 1984, p. 1-2.
"Support for Synthetic Fuels Building in Congress." Patrick
Crow. Oil and Gas Journal. 30 July 1979, 77:113-116.
"Synfuels Cuts Threaten Security." Richard Lieber. Denver
Post. 29 August 1984.
"Synfuels Guarantee Put at $92
Washington P o s t . 24 July 1984.

a Barrel." Michael Isikoff.

"Synfuels Must Start Now." Armand Hammer. The Oil Daily.
19 Apirl 1985, p. 4.
"Synfuel's President Under Fire: Three Directors
SeekOuster."
Howard Kurtz. Washington P o s t . 9 August 1983, p.A-1.
"Synfuels Still Has Role in Energy Program." Buffalo N e w s .
12 August 1984.
"Synthetic Fuels Corporation - Investment Bank or Government
Agency?" Robert C. Pozen. The Business Lawyer. April 1981,
36:953-968.
"The Battered SFC." John H. Jennich. Oil and Gas Journal.
24 November 1980, p. 62.
"The Billions for Synfuels are Ready to Flow." BusinessWe^.
29 March 1982, p. 154.

107
"The Biography of a Corporation." Harvey F. Pinney.
Public Administration Review. Spring 1943, 3:178-181.
"The Continuing Threat of Oil Supply Interruptions."
John P. Weyant. Journal of Policy Analysis and Managm^ni1984, 3: 393-405.
— ----------- ^---"The Federal Perspective on Third Sector Management."
Caspar Weinberger. Public Administration Review. September/
October 1975, 35: 456-458.
“
"The Government Corporation as a Tool of Foreign Policy."
Fritz Karl Mann. Public Administration Review. Summer 1943,
3:194-204.
"
"
"The Government Corporation Control Act of 1945." C. Herman
Pritchett. American Political Science Review. June 1946,
Vol. 40.
"The Government Corporation: Organization and Controls."
Harold Seidman. Public Administration Review. Summer 1954,
14:183-192.
"The Oil Crisis is Real this Time." BusinessWeek. 30 July
1979, p. 44-60.
"The Paradox of the Government Corporation." C. Herman
Pritchett. Public Administration Review. Summer 1941,
1:381-389.
"The Role of Synfuels in Our Future Energy Supply."
Victor Schroeder. Industrial Development. March/April 1982,
151:22-24.
"The Synfuels Corporation." William C. Kelly. Synfuels.
21 October 1980.
"The Theory of the Autonomous Government Corporation:
A
Critical Appraisal." Harold Seidman. Public Administration
Review. Spring 1952, 12:89-96.
"The Underground Federal Government: Bane of the Balanced
Budget?" James T. Bennett and Thomas J. Dilorenzo. Cato
Institute Policy Analysis. 21 October 1982.
"Trimming $9 Billion in Federal Fat." Congressman Trent Lott
Mississippi P r e s s . 5 August 1984.
"TVA at Age Fifty - Reflections and Retrospect." Steven M.
Neuse. Public Administration Review. November/December 1983,
43:491-498.
"U.S. Dependence on Oil, Gas Imports May Grow." Richard B.
Schmitt. Wall Street Journal. 23 April 1985, sec. 1, p. o.

108
I I I ) . Public Documents:
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations^
The Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources.
Oversight of the Energy Security: Implementation of
the Synthetic Fuels Corporation. 97th Cong., 1st sess.,
1981.
U.S. Congress. Senate. The Energy Security A c t . Public L.
96-294, 96th Con g . , 2nd sess., 1980, s. 932.
U.S. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch
of the Government. The Hoover Commission Report.
New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1949.
U.S. General Accounting Office. Report to the Chairman,
United States Synthetic Fuels Corporation: Evaluation
of Administrative Procedures at the Synthetic Fuels
Corporation. October 18, 1982.

I V ) . Interviews:
Ink, Dwight. Former Vice President for Administration.
U.S. Synthetic Fuels Corporation. Washington, D.C.
Interview. October 24, 1984.
Moe, Ron. Specialist in Government Organizations. Congress
ional Research Service. Library of Congress. Washington,
D.C. Interview. October 23, 1984.
Seidman, Harold. Professor Emeritus. University of Connecticut
Washington, D.C. Interview. October 25, 1984.

V ) . Seminar:
Alan Dean, Seminar Director
"Roles and Management of Government Enterprises."
A Seminar sponsored by the National Institute of Public
Affairs (An Affiliate of the National Academy of
Public Administration)
Washington, D.C.
October 23-25, 1984.
V I ) . Congressional Hearing:
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Energy. The Future of
the U.S. Synthetic Fuels Corporation. Hearing before
the Committee on Energy. 98th Cong., 2nd sess., 1985

APPENDIX I
INVENTORY OF GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

109

INVEîrrORY OF GOVFRNÎIENT CORPORATIONS

GAO
Classification

Corporate
Legal
Status

Board of
Directors

Financing

Controls

Stock
Ownership

Legal
Authority

100%

15 use 714
et seq.

Predominately
Federal
Commodity
Credit
Corporation

Wholly

Corporation
for Public
Broadcasting

Export Import
Bank of the
United States

8 members
Secretary of
Agriculture
(Chairman) and
7 appointed by
the President
with advice and
consent of the
Senate

Capital stock of
$100M subscribed
by Treasury
authority to
borrow not to
exceed $258

Subject to GCCA
and supervision
and direction by
Secretary of
Agriculture

Private
non-profit

10 members
appointed by
President with
Senate
confirmation

Mainly appropria
tions but also
private funds

Audit by
Independent CPAs
and GAO In any
year when Federal
funds are made
available for
operations

Wholly
owned

5 members
appointed by the
President with
Senate
confirmation

$68 line of credit
from Treasury

Subject to GCCA

owned

Government
owned

No stock

47 use 396

100%

12 use
635-6351

Government
owned

GAO
Classification

Corporate
Legal
Status

Board of
Directors

Financing

Controls

Stock
Ownership

Legal
Authority
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Government
owned

7 use 1503
et seq.
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Federal
Federal Crop
Insurance
Corporation

Wholly
owned

7 members
appointed by
Secretary of
Agriculture
3 from Dept, of
Agriculture and
4 non-Government
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Capital stock of
$500M subscribed
by Treasury
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supervision by
Secretary of
Agriculture

Federal
Financing
Bank

Corporate
instrumen
tality of
the U.S.
Government

5 members;
Secretary of the
Treasury
(Chairman) and
4 appointed by
the President
from officers
and employees of
the Bank or of
any Federal
agency

Initial capital
not to exceed $100M
from Secretary of
the Treasury open
ended borrowing
from Treasury not
more than $158 in
total obligations
no twi ths tand ing
with the public at
any one time

Not under GCCA,
No stock
but budget and
audit provisions
for wholly owned
Government corp
orations apply;
subject to the
general supervision
and direction of
the Secretary of
the Treasury

12 use 22822296

Federal
Prison
Industries,
Inc.

Wholly
owned

6 members
appointed by
the President

Revenue derived
from sale of
products and
services to other
Federal agencies
and made avail
able through
appropriations
acts

Subect to GCCA

18 use 4121
et seq.

No stock

P

GAO
Classification

Corporate
Legal
Status

Board of
Directors

Financing

Controls

Stock
Ownership

Legal
Authority

Predominately
Federal
Government
National
Mortgage
Association
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owned

All powers
vested in
Secretary of
HUD

Open-ended
borrowing
permitted from
Treasury

Subject to GCCA

No stock

12 use
1716-1723b

Inter-American Nonprofit
Foundation

7 members
appointed by the
President with
Senate
confirmation

Appropriations
and private funds

Subject to GCCA

No stock

22 use 290f

Legal
Services
Corporation

Private
nonmembership
nonprofit

11 members
appointed by the
President with
Senate
confirmation

Appropriations

Audit by
independent CPAs.
GAO may audit
for any fiscal
year when Federal
funds are avail
able to finance
any portion of
operations

No stock

47 use
2996-2996k

National

Private
nonprofit

18 members;
3 ex officio
(Secretary of
HUD, Secretary
of Agriculture,
Director of
CSA) and 15
appointed by
the President
with Senate
confirmation

Unfunded,
authorization for
appropriations

Commercial type
audit by GAO

No stock

12 use
1701Y

Homeowner-

ship
Foundation

GAO
Classification

Corporate
Legal
Status

Board of
Directors

Financing

Controls

Stock
Ownership

Legal
Authority

Predominately
Federal
Neighborhood
Reinvestment
Corporation

Not
specified

6 members;
Appropriations
Chairman of
FHLBB, Secretary
of HUD, Chairman
of FDIC, member
of Federal
Reserve Board,
Comptroller of
the Currency,
and Administration
of NCUA

Must prepare a
No stock
business type
budget statement;
GAO may audit
during any fiscal
year when Federal
funds are avail
able to finance
operations of the
corporation or the
corporation's
grants and contracts,
also GAO shall audit
the corporation at
least once every 3
years, audit by
Independent CPAs

New
Community
Development
Corporatln

Not
specified

7 members;
Authority to
Secretary of HUD, borrow from the
5 appointed by
Treasury
Secretary of HUD,
1 appointed by
the President with
Senate confirmation

Direction and
supervision by
Secretary of HUD

No stock

42 use
8101-8107

42 use 4532,
4518(b)

(jj

GAO
Classification

Corporate
Legal
Status

Board of
Directors

Financing

Controls

Stock
Ownership

Legal
Authority

100% Govern
ment owned

22 use
2191-2200a

Predominately
Federal
Overseas
Private
Investment
Corporation

Pennsylvania
Avenue
Development
Corporation

Wholly
owned

Wholly
owned

15 members ;
Administrator of
AID (Chairman),
the U.S. Trade
Representative
or the Deputy
U.S. Trade
Representative
(Vice Chairman),
President of
the corporation,
ex officio,
8 appointed by
the President
with Senate con
firmation, and
4 U.S. officials
designated by
the President

$20M capital stock
subscribed by the
Treasury; appropria
tions to replenish
or Increase Insur
ance and guaranty
fund; line of credit
from Treasury not
to exceed $100M

15 voting members;
7 named Government
officials and 8
private citizens
appointed by the
President; 8 non
voting Government
officials appoint
ed by the
Chairman

Appropriations ;
Subject to GCCA
line of credit
from Treasury not
to exceed $100M;
may seek congres
sional authority
to Issue marketable
obligations

Subject to
GCCA

No stock

40 use
871-885

GAO
Classification

Corporate
Legal
Status

Board of
Directors

Financing

Controls

Stock
Ownership

Legal
Authority

Predominately
Federal
Pension
Benefit
Guaranty
Corporation

Wholly
owned

Saint
Lawrence
Seaway
Development
Corporation

Wholly
owned

Not
specified

Solar Energy
and Energy
Conservation
Bank

3 members ;
Secretary of
Labor (Chairman),
Secretary of the
Treasury, and
Secretary of
Commerce

Self-financed by
revolving funds In
Treasury; $100M
line of credit
from Treasury

Subject to GCCA

No stock

29 use
1301-1381

Administrator
appointed by the
President with
advice and consent
of the Senate and
an Advisory Board
of 5 members
appointed by the
President with
advice and consent
of the Senate

Revenue derived
from tolls charged
for use of facil
ities and made
available through
appropriations
acts; may Issue
revenue bonds to
Treasury up to
$140M

Subject to GCCA
and supervision
and direction by
Secretary of
Transportation

No stock

33 use
981-990

5 members;
Secretary of HUD,
Secretary of DOE,
Secretary of the
Treasury, Sec
retary of Agri
culture and
Secretary of
Commerce

Appropriations

Audit to GAO

No stock

12 use 3601
et seq.

Ln

GAO
Classification

Corporate
Legal
Status

Board of
Directors

Financing

Controls

Stock
Ownership

Legal
Authority

Predominately
Federal
U.S. Railway
Association

U.S.
Synthetic
Fuels
Corporation

Nonprofit
5 members;
association Secretary of
Transportation,
Comptroller
General of the
U.S., Chairman
of the ICC,
Chairman of
Conrall Board
of Directors,
and the current
Chairman of USRA
Is also served
by an Advisory
Board made up of
members who had
served on USRA*s
Board of Directors
on August 12, 1981
Not
specified

7 members
appointed by the
President with
Senate
confirmation

Appropriations ;
may also Issue
obligations not
to exceed $395M
outstanding at
any one time

Subject to GCCA;
submits budget
concurrently to
0MB and to the
Congress

No stock

46 use
711-729

Appropriations to
the Secretary of
the Treasury for
purchasing the
corporation* s
notes; and $208
borrowing from
appropriated funds
from Treasury

Audit by GAO and
CPAs ; audits,
Investigation,
and Inspection
by the corpora
tion's Inspector
General

No stock

42 use
8711-8795

o>

Corporate
GAO
Legal
Classification Status

Board of
Directors

Financing

Controls

Stock
Ownership

Legal
Authority

45 use
741-794,
722

Mixed
Federal/
Private
Consolidated
Rail
Corporation
(Conrall)

Federal
Deposit
Insurance
Corporation

Private
for
profit

13 members; 6
elected by stock,
debentures, and
Series A
preferred stock
holders; 3
elected by
Series B pre
ferred stock
holders ;
2 elected by
common stock
holders; and the
chief executive
officer and
chief operating
officer of the
corporation

Appropriations to
permit USRA to
purchase up to
$18 of deben
tures, up to
$2.68 of
Series A pre
ferred stock and
accounts receiv
able; authority
to Issue debt
Instruments,
Series B pre
ferred stock,
and common stock;
revenues from
charges for rail
services

Audit by GAO In
any year when
Federal funds
are being used
to finance
operations under
45 use 747; audit
and examination
by USRA, GAO,
and Secretary of
Transporatlon
until financial
assistance Is
repaid under
45 use 722

USRA,
Department
of Trans
portation,
and others

Mixed
ownership

3 members;
Comptroller of
the Currency and
2 appointed by
the President
with advice and
consent of the
Senate

Authority to
borrow from
Treasury for
Insurance pur
poses; assess
ments made
against Insured
banks

Subject to GCCA

No stock
(retired)

12 use 1811
et seq.

GAO
Classification

Corporate
Legal
Status

Board of
Directors

Financing

Controls

Stock
Ownership

Legal
Authority

Mixed
Federal/
Private
Federal
Savings and
Loan
Insurance
Corporation

Wholly
owned

Under direction
of FHLBB

Original capitalSubject to GCCA
ization of $100M
subscribed by U.S.
has been repaid
with interest;
authority to borrow
up to $750M from
Treasury; assess
ments (premiums)
made against insured
institutions

No stock
(retired)

12 use 1725
et seq.

National
Mixed
Credit Union . ownership
Administration
Central
,
Liquidity
Facility

Managed by the
NCUA Board (3 mem
bers appointed by
the President with
Senate confirma
tion)

Capital subscrip
tion from member
credit unions;
authorized to
borrow up to $500M
from Treasury

Subject to GCCA

Member
credit
unions

12 use
1795, 1752a

Private
as a for
profit
mxied
ownership

9 members ; Sec
retary of Trans
portation, ex of
ficio, 3 appointed
by the President
with Senate con
firmation, 2 se
lected by commuter
authorities, 2
elected by stock
holders , and the
President of the
Corporation

Common stock sold
to railroads;
guaranteed loans;
Treasury borrow
ings appropria
tions; and may
issue bonds, notes
and other certif
icates of indebted
ness, revenues
from charges for
rail services

Subject to GCCA
except for audit.
Performance audit
required under
45 use 644(2)(A);
audit by indep
endent licensed
public accountants

Common
45 use 501,
stock to
502, 541-645
railroads;
preferred
stock to the
Secretary of
Transportation

National
Railroad
Passenger
Corporation
(Amtrak)

00

GAO
ClasslfIcatIon
Mixed
Federal/
Private

Corporate
Legal
Status

Board of
Directors

Financing

Controls

Stock
Ownership

Legal
Authority

Northeast
Commuter
Services
Corporation*

Not
specified

6 members; Presi
dent of Northeast
Commuter, ex of
ficio, 1 member
of Amtrak's Board
of Directors,
2 members selected
by Amtrak's Board
of Directors, and
2 members from com
muter authorities

Appropriations to
the Secretary of
Transportation to
help defray start
up costs of com
muter services,
authority to issue
common stock in
Amtrak

None

Amtrak

45 use 581
et seq.

Rural
Telephone
Bank

Wholly
owned

13 members; 5 des
ignated by the
President (3 from
Agriculture and 2
from the public
who will resign
when 51% of the
class A stock is
retired). 6 elect
ed from coopera
tives eligible to
receive loans.
Administrator of
REA, and Governor
of FCA (Both
ex officio)

$600M authorized
in Government
stock subscrip
tion; borrowers
required to in
vest in stock
that is retired
over a period of
years; sale of
obligations to
public and Treasury

Subject to GCCA
as a wholly owned
Government corp
oration until
converted to
private owner
ship

Government
and othrs

7 use
941-950b

*Formerly known as the Amtrak Commuter Services Corporation
VO

GAO
Classification

Corporate
Legal
Status

Board of
Directors

Financing

Controls

Stock
Ownership

Legal
Authority

Mixed
Federal/
Private
Securities
Investor
Protection
Corporation

Private
nonprofit

7 members; 1
appointed by the
Secretary of
the Treasury, 1
appointed by the
Federal Reserve
Board, and 5
appointed by
the President
with Senate
confirmation
(3 from industry,
2 from the public)

Authorized to
receive up to
$1B in Treasury
loans through
SEC (not used);
assessments
against members

Subject to
examinations and
inspections by
SEC

No stock

15 use
78aaa-78111

Tennessee
Valley
Authority

Wholly
owned

3 members
appointed by the
President with
advice and
consent of the
Senate

Appropriations
and revenues from
sale of power

Subject to GCCA

No stock

16 use 831
et seq.

GAO
Classification

Corporate
Legal
Status

Board of
Directors

Financing

Controls

Stock
Ownership

Legal
Authority

No stock

39 use 201
et seq.

Mixed
Federal/
Private
U.S. Postal
Service

Independ
ent estab
lishment
of the
executive
branch

11 members;
9 appointed by
the President with
Senate confirma
tion, Postmaster
General, and
Deputy Postmaster
General,
ex officio

Transferred
assets of former
Post Office
Department ;
sale of
obligations to
public or to
Treasury not in
excess of $103;
appropriations
for nonselfsustaining
services ;
revenues from
services
rendered

Must prepare
business-type
budget state
ment; subject
to GAO audit;
may obtain audits
by CPAs

NÏ

GAO
Classlficaton

Corporate
Legal
Status

Board of
Directors

Financing

Controls

Stock
Ownership

Legal
Authority

Capital stock
subscribed by
member coopera
tives and
Governor of
the FCA

Subject to GCCA
and supervision
by FCA

Member
coopera
tives

12 use
2121-2134,
2151, 2223,
2254

Predominately
Private
Banks for
Cooperatives

Mixed
ownership

7 members (for
each of the 12
Farm Credit
District Boards);
2 elected by
Federal land
bank associations,
2 elected by pro
duction credit
associations,
2 elected by
borrowers from
or subscribers to
the bank for
cooperatives
guaranty fund,
and 1 appointed
by Governor of FCA
with advice and
consent of the
Federal Farm Credit
Board

ro

NS

GAO
Classification

Corporate
Legal
Status

Board of
Directors

Financing

Controls

Stock
Ownership

Legal
Authority

Predominately
Private
Central Bank
for
Cooperatives

Mixed
ownership

Up to 13 members;
1 elected from
each Farm Credit
district and 1
member at large
appointed by
Governor of FCA
with advice and
consent of Federal
Farm Credit Board

Capital stock
subscribed by
member coopera
tives and by
Governor of FCA

Subject to GCCA
and supervision
by FCA

Member
12 USC 2121cooperatlves 2134, 2151, 2254

Communica
tions
Satellite
Corporation
(Comsat)

Private
for
proflt

15 members; 12
elected by stockholders and 3
appointed by the
President with
Senate confirma
tion

Capital stock
sold to the public

Regulation by
FCC as a private
utility

100%
privately
owned

47 USC
731-735

Federal Home
Loan Banks

Mixed
ownership

Capital sub
scription by
members

Subject to GCCA

Member
banks

12 USC 1421
et seq.

14 directors for
each bank; 8
elected by members
and 8 appointed by
the FHLBB

NS

W

GAO
Classification

Corporate
Legal
Status

Board of
Directors

Financing

Controls

Stock
Ownership

Legal
Authority

12 USC
1452-1459

Predominately
Private
Federal Home
Loan Mortgage
Corporation

Not
specified

FHLBB

$100M common
stock subscribed
by Federal Home
Loan Banks and
sales of obliga
tions

Commercial type
audit by GAO

Federal
Home Loan
Banks

Federal
Intermediate
Credit Banks

Mixed
ownership

Not
specified

Capital stock
subscribed by
production credit
associations and
Governor of FCA

Subject to GCCA
and supervision
by FCA

Production
12 USC 2071credit
2079, 2151,
associa
2254
tions ; non
voting stock
issued to Gov
ernor of FCA

Federal
Land Bank
Associations

Not

Not specified;
directors elected
from voting
shareholders

Stock subscribed
by members of the
associations

Subject to
supervision of
Federal Land
Bank for the
district and
FCA

Bank
borrowers

specified

12 USC 20312034, 20512055, 2254

ho

GAO
Classification

Corporate
Legal
Status

Board of
Directors

Financing

Controls

Stock
Ownership

Legal
Authority

Predominately
Private
Federal Land
Banks

Mixed
ownership

Not

Federal
National
Mortgage
Association

Government
sponsored
private
corpora
tion

15 members; 10
elected by stock
holders and 5 ap
pointed by the
President

specified

Capital stock
subscribed by
Federal Land Bank
Associations ;
direct borrowers
through agents
who are farmers
or ranchers, and
Governors of FCA

Subject to GCCA
and supervision
by FCA

Federal
Land Bank
Associa
tions and
direct and
Indirect
borrowers ;
nonvoting
stock
Issued to
Governor
of FCA

12 USC 2011,
2020, 20512055, 2151,
2254

$2,258 line of
credit from
Treasury; capital
contributions
from mortgage
sellers or
borrowers

Subject to gen
eral regulatory
power of
Secretary of

100%
Privately
owned

12 USC
1716-1723b

HUD

N3
Ln

GAO
Classification

Corporate
Legal
Status

Board of
Directors

Financing

Controls

Stock
Ownership

Legal
Authority

Predominately
Private
Federal
Reserve
Banks

Not
specified

9 members for
each bank; 6
elected by
stockholding
banks and 3
designated by
Board of Gov
ernors of
Federal Reserve
System

Capital stock
subscribed by
member banks

Audit by GAO;
subject to gen
eral regulatory
powers of Board
of Governors of
Federal Reserve
System

Member
banks and
others

12 USC 281,
290, 301,
308

Gallaudet
College

Private
nonprofit

21 members;
1 Senator
appointed by the
President of the
Senate, 2 Rep
resentatives
appointed by the
Speaker of the
House, and 18
nonpublic members

Appropriations ;
tuition, fees,
etc.

Subject to GAO
audit and
settlement

No stock

Act of
Feb. 16,
1857 (11
Stat. 161)
as amended
by P.L.
83-420

N>

GAO
Classification

Corporate
Legal
Status

Board of
Directors

Financing

Stock
Ownership

Legal
Authority

Subject to GAO
audit and audit
by Independent
CPAs

No stock

22 USC 478

Books open to
Inspection by
Department of
Education

No stock

20 USC
121-129

Controls

Predominately
Private
Gorgas
Memorial
Institute of
Tropical and
Preventive
Medicine,
Inc.

Private
nonprofit

47 members;
officials of the
Governments of
United States
and Panama,
representatives
of national and
international
agencies, and
leading U.S. and
Latin American
scientists and
other profes
sionals

Howard
University

Private
nonprofit

Appropriations ;
31 members of
tuition, fees,
Board of Trustees
all nonpublic ; 25
etc.
perpetual members,
2 elected graduates,
2 elected students,
and 2 elected from
faculty

Appropriations ;
may accept funds
from any Latin
American
Government

GAO
Classification

Corporate
Legal
Status

Board of
Directors

Financing

Controls

Stock
Ownership

Legal
Authority

Predominately
Private
National
Consumer
Cooperative
Bank*

National
Corporation
for Housing
Partnerships

Not
specified

Private

for
profit

15 members; 3 ap
pointed by the
President with
Senate confirma
tion and 12
members elected
by holders of
Class B and
Class C stock

Appropriations ;
sale of debt
Instruments;
capital stock
subscribed by
Government,
borrowers from
the Bank,
cooperatives
eligible to
become borrowers,
organizations
owned and con
trolled by such
borrowers,
foundations, trust
or charitable
funds, public
bodies, and other
public or private
Investors

Examination and
audit by the FCA
and GAO

Borrowers
of the Bank
and
Government

12 USC 3011
et seq.

15 members; 12
elected by stock
holders and 3
appointed by the
President with
Senate
confirmation

Authority to Issue
stock; revenues
from operations

Audit by
Independent
CPAs

100%
privately
owned

40 USC
3931-3941

*Classlfled as predominately private because P.L. 97-35 provided the conversion of the bank to a private
financial institution beginning with the conversion of U.S. owned class A stock on December 31, 1981

hO
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GAO
Classification

Corporate
Legal
Status

Board of
Directors

Financing

Controls

Stock
Ownership

Legal
Authority

Predominately
Private
National Park
Foundation

Charitable Up to 23 members;
nonprofit
Secretary of
corporation Interior (Chair
man) , Director
of National Park
Service (Sec
retary) , and
6-21 private
citizens
appointed by
Secretary of the
Interior

Production
Credit
Associations

Not
specified

Not specified

Services by
Interior and
Justice without
reimbursement,
donations, gifts
and bequests
from private
sector

None

No stock

16 USC
19 e-n

Capital stock
subscribed by
eligible
borrowers and
Governor of FCA

Subject to
supervision by
the Federal
Intermediate
Credit Banks
of the district
and FCA

Members
who are
eligible
borrowers

12 USC 2091,
2098, 2151,
2254

NJ

VO

GAO
Classification

Corporate
Legal
Status

Board of
Directors

Financing

Controls

Stock
Ownership

Legal
Authority

100%

20 USC
1087-2

Predominately
Private
Student
Loan
Marketing
Association

Government
sponsored
private
corpora
tion

21 members; 14
elected by stock
holders and
7 appointed by
the President

Authority to
borrow from the
FFB; can Issue
debt obligations
with approval of
Secretary of
Education and
Secretary of the
Treasury
(obligations
guaranteed by
Secretary of
Education); can
Issue common stock
to Insured lenders

Department of
Education
approval of
borrowing;
audit by Inde
pendent CPAs

privately
owned

w
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COMPARISON OF ON-BUDGET AND OFF-BUDGET FINANCING
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Comparison of On-Budget and Off-Budget Financing
(1981 Dollars In Millions)
Corporation
Budget
Authority

On-Budget
Total
Receipts
Obligations

Off-Budget
Outlays

Federal
Financing
Bank (FFB)
Rural
Telephone
Bank
Student Loan
Marketing
Association
U.S. Postal
Service
U.S. Railway
Association

__

Receipts

Total
Obligations

Outlays

$30,268.9

$18,012.8

$39,048.3

$21,035.5

126.5

85.1

212.3

113.7

1,074.4

3,099.8

2,078.7

21,144.7

22,185.2

88.5

335.6

68.8

-266.8

6.2

6.2

$40.658.8

$64.620.6

a/

2 ,222.6
$1,343.2

$1,343.2

$1,343.2

29.0

29.0

26.3

U.S. Synthetic
Fuels
Corporation
Total

Budget
Authority

b/

Sl.372.2

$1.372.2

$1.369.5

— ^Authority to borrow— currently funded through the FFB.
FFB in 1981.

228.3
c/
6.2
$32.852.5

$23.049.6

The Corporation actually borrowed $1,955 million from the

— ^Payments for the purchase of U.S. Synthetic Fuels Corporation's notes are shown as Treasury Department outlays.
— ^Contract authority.
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